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Thesis Abstract 
 
The effect of anxiety-related thought suppression on memory processes, and 
its relation to decreased interhemispheric interaction 
Gülcan Akçalan 
 
 
 
The present study investigated the effect of thought suppression on 
different forms of memory systems (recognition, recollection, familiarity, 
and perceptual priming) and its relation to degree of handedness through 
interhemispheric processing. A nonclinical sample of 178 undergraduates 
was randomly divided into four conditions according to the type of memory 
task (either explicit or implicit) and the presence or absence of the 
suppression instruction. At the beginning of the session all subjects were 
exposed to an anxiety evoking slideshow which was used as a suppression 
target. The result of the study indicated no effect of mere suppression 
instruction on all forms of memory in all conditions (strongly right 
handedness vs. mixed handedness). However, analyses for suppression 
effort and suppression success revealed significant conclusions. Marginal 
impairment in general strength of recognition memory was observed when 
individuals manage not to think of unwanted thoughts by spending high 
effort. Under this condition the effect of perceptual priming was maintained. 
It is concluded that the disturbance in explicit memory performance resulted 
from rehearsal interruption associated with depleted cognitive resources.  
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Regarding the effect of thought suppression on interhemispheric 
coherence, the results indicated that successful thought suppression was 
associated with a decline in episodic memory performance of mixed-handed 
individuals. Therefore, a potential relation of thought suppression to 
decreased hemispheric integration was suggested. Finally, degree of 
handedness, but not suppression, was identified as a moderating factor in 
perceived negativity.  
The implications of the findings for psychoanalytic theory of 
repression and psychotherapy are discussed.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
Tez Özeti 
 
Kaygı Yaratan Bir Düşüncenin Bastırılmasının Bellek İşlevlerine Etkisi ve 
Bastırmanın Beynin İki Yarım Küresi Arasındaki İletişim Düzeyiyle İlişkisi 
Gülcan Akçalan 
 
 
 
Bu çalışma kaygı yaratan bir düşüncenin bastırılmasının çeşitli 
bellek sistemlerine (tanıma, biriktirme, aşinalık ve örtük bellek) etkisini ve 
bastırmanın el asimetrisiyle ilişkisini (beynin iki hemisferi arasındaki 
iletişim düzeyiyle ilişkisine dayanarak) incelemiştir.   
178 tane klinik bir durumu olmayan üniversite rasgele, bastırma 
yönergesinin olup olmamasına ve bellek testinin çeşidine göre (belirtik ya 
da örtük) dört farklı gruba bölünmüştür.  Deney oturumunun başında 
katılımcılar kaygı uyandıran bir slayt gösterisi izlemişlerdir. Bunun ardından 
serbest çağrışım yazısı sırasında bastırma yönergesi olan gruptan, bu 
resimleri düşünmemesi istenmiştir. Çalışmanın sonuçları sadece bastırma 
yönergesi almış olmanın bellek süreçlerine bir etki olmadığını göstermiştir. 
Bununla birlikte, bastıma çabası ve bastırma başarısı üzerine yapılan 
analizler önemli bulgular sunmaktadır. Katılımcılar çok çaba sarf ederek 
başarılı bir bastırma gerçekleştirdiklerinde resimleri doğru olarak 
hatırlamakta zorlanmışlardır. Diğer taraftan ise bu durumda örtük bellek 
performanslarında herhangi bir bozulma gözlenmemiştir. Belirtik bellek 
performansındaki bozulmanın sebebi olarak, bastırma sonucu enerji 
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kaynaklarının tükenmesi ve buna bağlı olarak tekrarlama sürecinin sekteye 
uğraması sonucuna varılmıştır.  
El asimetrisi ile ilgili analizlerde, belirgin bir el kullanma tercihi 
olmayan katılımcıların episodik bellek performanslarında bastırma sonunda 
bir düşüş gözlenmiştir. Güçlü bir sağ el kullanma tercihi gösteren 
katılımcılarda ise böyle bir düşüş görülmemiştir. Bu bulgulara dayanarak 
başarılı bir bastırmanın, beynin iki hemisferi arasındaki aktivasyon 
uyumunda bir bozulmayla ilgili olabileceği görüşü önerilmiştir. Son olarak 
da sonuçlar, dış dünyadaki olumsuzlukları algılamada belirgin bir el 
kullanma tercihi olmayanların daha dayanıklı olduğu bulunmuştur. 
Bastırmanın ise kayda değer herhangi bir etkisi gözlenmemiştir. 
Psikanalitik bastırma teorisine ve psikoterapiye dair çıkarımlar 
çalışmanın sonuçları ışığında tartışıldı.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
…The grief that does not speak 
Whispers the o'er fraught heart, and bids it break.  
(Shakespeare, 1603-1606) 
 
One of the criticisms towards the arguments of psychoanalysis is that 
they lack empirical support based on public evidence. Most of the 
psychoanalytic theories are still based on knowledge coming from case 
studies. Although this is a valuable source of knowledge, it might be 
difficult to replicate and generalize that knowledge to all population. That 
has been the common reason for the disapproval of psychoanalytic theories 
by many scientists. On the other hand, recent developments in cognitive 
science and neuroscience (e.g. implicit memory, subliminal perception, 
fMRI studies, infant studies, and etc.) open a way to discuss the premises of 
psychoanalysis in a more scientific setting. One objective of this study is to 
investigate the psychoanalytic theory of repression with an experimental 
design. Another criticism towards psychoanalytic theories, particularly 
repression theory, has been that theorists focus on the consequences of 
psychic mechanisms rather than the mechanism itself. For instance, what 
mechanisms underlie repression is not been well known yet. Thus, this study 
attempts to contribute to understanding underlying mechanisms of 
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psychoanalytic concept of repression via applying thought suppression 
paradigm.  
 
1.1 Emotion Regulation  
 In everyday life we face many unpleasant thoughts and feelings. In 
order to deal with these unpleasant situations we use different strategies. 
Campos and his colleagues (2004, p. 380) defined “emotion regulation as 
the modification of any processes in the system that generates emotion or its 
manifestation in behavior”. According to them emotion regulation does not 
involve just the emotion processes that occur after an emotion is elicited. 
Rather, emotion regulation comprises all processes before the generation of 
an emotion, during the activation of it and after that (Campos et al., 2004).  
Emotion regulation mainly involves interactions between the 
functions of cortical and subcortical brain regions (Ochsner, & Gross, 
2005). Subcortical regions, particularly the limbic system, are the emotion-
generative center of the brain (LeDoux, 1998). Limbic system appeared 
earlier during evolution and contains primitive and simple structures of the 
brain which are also present in many species. Hippocampus and amygdala 
are the two important parts of the limbic system. While the hippocampus 
primarily regulates learning and memory, the amygdala is specialized in 
emotions, such as “feelings and expressions of emotions, emotional 
memories, recognition of the signs of emotions in other people” (Carlson, 
2004, p. 86). Cortical regions play an inhibitory role in the activation of 
these emotion-generative structures (LeDoux, 1998). Cortical inhibition 
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exists at a baseline level for each person. Campos and his colleagues (2004, 
p. 380) suggested that “in many cases, the elicitation of emotion is as much 
a function of the release of existing inhibition”. According to this view all 
human emotion experiences are somehow regulated.  
LeDoux (1998) identified a descending pathway between the medial 
prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the amygdala in his studies on rats. When the 
rats’ medial PFC was damaged, they needed much more time to extinguish 
their aversive conditional behaviors. In this regard, interaction between 
cortical and subcortical systems on emotion regulation involving aversive 
stimuli may be specifically through the pathway between the medial PFC 
and the amygdala. Davidson, Jackson, and Kalin (2000) speculated that it is 
the left PFC that primarily inhibits the activity of amygdala.  
Early studies of emotion regulation began with Freud’s theory of 
defense mechanisms. Today, although Freud’s many ideas have been 
disputed by contemporary theorists, almost all psychologists accept the 
existence of defense mechanisms. Emotion regulation mechanisms are 
categorized differently by different theoretical orientations. Psychoanalytic 
way of categorizing emotion regulation mechanisms involves primary 
(primitive) defensive processes and secondary (higher-order) defensive 
processes (McWilliams, 1994). Defenses that involve the issues about 
“boundary between the self and the outer world” are referred as primary or 
primitive defenses (p. 98). The latter one refers to defenses that “deal with 
internal boundaries, such as those between the ego superego and the id, or 
between the observing and experiencing parts of the ego” (p. 98). Primitive 
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defenses include withdrawal, denial, omnipotent control, idealization-
devaluation, projection-introjection-projective identification, splitting, and 
dissociation. Higher-order defenses include repression, regression, isolation, 
intellectualization, rationalization, moralization, compartmentalization, 
undoing, displacement, reaction formation, and sublimation (McWilliams, 
1994). Primitive defenses occur early in life, while higher-order defenses 
require more developed cognitive and brain organizations. Due to 
unconscious nature of defense mechanisms, they are difficult to be 
empirically examined. Nevertheless, observational and self report methods 
provided evidence for different types of defenses; their hierarchical order; 
and their relation to psychic organizations, such as personality, 
psychopathology, self-esteem, interpersonal relationships and therapeutic 
alliance (e.g. Bond, 2004; Ekehammar, Zuber, & Konstenius, 2005; 
Fransson, Sundbom, & Hagglof, 1998). 
Gross (2002) identifies three features of emotion regulation that are 
applicable to all theoretical orientations. First, not only negative emotions 
are subject to regulation, but also positive emotions are regulated, such as 
increasing or maintaining them. Second, emotion regulation includes both 
conscious and unconscious processes. That is, it can occur intentionally or 
automatically. Finally, emotion regulation may be either adaptive or 
maladaptive. Some forms of emotion regulation can be adaptive for some 
people and not for others. Moreover, even the same emotion regulation 
strategies can be adaptive for the same person for some times but not for 
other times. 
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1.2 Suppression 
 1.2.1 Expressive Suppression vs. Thought Suppression 
One of the emotion regulation strategies being paid special attention 
by many researchers is suppression. Suppression strategies occur after an 
emotion is generated (Gross, 2002) and can be categorized in two groups. 
The first is expressive suppression. Suppression of emotional expression 
involves a deliberate attempt to cover behavioral expression of emotional 
experiences (Gross, 1998). The second is thought suppression. Thought 
suppression is inhibiting unwanted thoughts through trying not to think 
about it (Wegner, 1987). Thought suppression is regarded as an effortful 
attempt to get rid of a distressing thought from consciousness. In everyday 
life we spend a substantial amount of energy by trying not to think of our 
worries, regrets, failures, habits that we want to quit, situations in which we 
have felt embarrassed, and etc. 
Valentiner and his colleagues (2006) compared Wegner’s thought 
suppression with Gross’s suppression of emotional expression in terms of 
whether they are conceptually two different phenomena. They developed a 
16-item questionnaire consisting of questions related to thought suppression 
and expressive suppression strategies. The result of factor analysis indicated 
that although these two constructs go hand in hand, they represent different 
phenomena. 
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1.2.2 Psychoanalytic Defense Mechanism of Repression  
Thought suppression is compatible with Freud’s concept of 
repression. Repression, as conceptualized by Freud (1915), is a way of 
protecting self from distressing thoughts by keeping them away from 
consciousness. Freud (1915) divides repression into two types. Primary 
repression involves impulses, affects or events belonging to early years of 
life. Because these are never encoded through conscious mechanisms of the 
mind, they are never recollected consciously. Secondary repression occurs 
in later years of life, in response to unbearable emotions, events or desires. 
The latter is the scope of this study. 
Freud’s explanation of psychopathology mainly relies on repression 
mechanism (Freud, 1915). According to his view, all psychic acts are 
organized in line with pleasure principle. That is, organisms’ main 
motivation is to gain pleasure and avoid pain. Freud uses a ‘flight-reflex’ 
metaphor for repression:  “These processes strive towards gaining pleasure: 
psychical activity draws back from any event which might arouse 
unpleasure” (Freud, 1911, p. 219). While this withdrawal works for keeping 
‘clear’ the conscious part of the mind from unpleasurable stimuli, its effects 
are seen through unconscious mechanisms, such as “resistances, symptoms, 
dreams, distortions of conscious representation, amnesia, inhibitions, and 
childhood fears” (Freud, 1911, p. 378). 
 Ironically, repression has been seen as associated with detrimental 
effects on the self rather than its expected protective function (Freud, 1915). 
According to Freud (as cited in Boag, 2007) repression process involves 
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disintegration of affect from thought. Through this process the strength of 
the thought decreases and it eventually disappears from consciousness. This 
process of weakening the thought will involve the dissolution of the links 
between the thought and its context. Repression process only makes stop the 
existence of unwanted thoughts, feelings, wishes, or images in 
consciousness (Freud, 1915). On the other hand, repressed materials 
maintain its existence in the unconscious layer of the mind. Because of the 
absence of rational mechanisms and appropriate true associations of these 
materials, repressed thoughts even become stronger by developing new false 
connections (Freud, 1915). As these connections develop, they need more 
energy to be repressed. Such a process costs an enormous amount of 
“psychic energy” (Freud, 1915).  
 
1.2.3 Thought Suppression vs. Psychoanalytic Repression  
 Traditionally, the main distinction between suppression and 
repression is that while suppression involves conscious mechanism, 
repression operates unconsciously (Geisler, 1985). Thinking through 
Freud’s conceptualization of mind, in repression unwanted thoughts and 
memories are pushed into the unconscious, whereas in suppression they are 
pushed into the preconscious. Therefore, suppressed thoughts can more 
readily come into the consciousness in the presence of reminder cues. On 
the other hand, psychoanalytic theorists suggest that repressed thoughts are 
never recollected consciously, we can just see their influences on behavior. 
Erten (2006) defined suppression as refusing to think and thus eventually 
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forgetting unwanted thought, and repression as forgetting that that unwanted 
thought has been forgotten. When one engages in suppression one day, the 
next day s/he may remember his forgetting.  
There are some differences among the psychoanalytic authors in 
terms of conceptualizing repression and suppression. Some argued the 
presence of conscious components in repression, so that suppression and 
repression are somewhat compatible (e.g. Erdelyi & Goldberg, as cited in 
Geisler, 1985). More commonly accepted view is that they are different but 
related. In this regard, suppression and repression represent two poles of a 
continuum from conscious to unconscious (Brenner, as cited in Werman, 
1983). As Ross (2003, p. 65) put into the words,  
 
“…percepts, as well as images are at first consciously suppressed 
because they are sources of danger, of fear, and subsequent shame 
in a psychosocial context of consensual disingenuousness. Only after 
erupting into awareness are they then intrapsychically disclaimed 
and thereafter forgotten - preconsciously disavowed and, 
subsequently, unconsciously repressed.”  
 
Hinsie and Campbell (as cited in Werman, 1983, p. 407), also 
claimed that suppression may precede repression by signing the target to be 
repressed. According to them, 
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“[Suppression] is the act of consciously inhibiting an impulse, affect, 
or idea, as in the deliberate attempt to forget something and think no 
more about it. Suppression is thus to be differentiated from 
repression which is an unconscious process. It is probable that there 
is no sharp line of demarcation between suppression and repression, 
and it seems also likely that on occasion the unconscious defense of 
repression may be directed against material which the individual 
consciously suppresses. Nonetheless, it seems advisable in most 
instances to regard suppression and repression as distinctly different 
mechanisms.”   
 
Jones (1993) contributed to the theories on the distinction/relation 
between repression and suppression such that she came up with five types of 
repression. First is called preverbal infantile repression (same as Freud’s 
primary suppression), the second is post-verbal infantile repression 
(nonverbally encoded experiences), the third is state-dependent repression 
(experiences encoded during an altered state of consciousness), the forth is 
conditional repression (previously conscious experiences are repressed 
through classical or operant conditioning), and the final is automatized 
suppression. Jones (1993) described automatized suppression such that 
unwanted ideas, feelings, images or wishes are first deliberately refused to 
be thought. This conscious effortful attempt gradually becomes 
automatized, thus eventually unwanted materials are kept away from 
awareness automatically. Namely, they are repressed. In that sense, only 
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automatized suppression type of repression includes a suppression 
mechanism that precedes repression.     
  
1.2.4 Experimental Studies on Ironic Process of Thought     
Suppression 
 Suppression is defined as a way of avoiding distressing, unwanted 
stimuli by consciously trying not to think about them in the previous 
section. It is assumed as conscious counterpart of unconscious repression 
mechanism. A growing number of studies have been conducted in order to 
test Freud’s theory of repression. Although it is difficult to study with 
repressed materials in experimental conditions due to their unconscious 
nature, suppression which involves conscious mechanisms reveals 
opportunities for experimental explorations. In this regard, exploring the 
mechanism and consequences of thought suppression somehow helps us to 
get insight into its mechanisms and consequences. Therefore, such studies 
reveal significant indications for the nature of psychological problems and 
therapeutic work. 
According to the literature, as Freud suggested for overuse of 
repressive style, thought suppression is too not associated with promising 
consequences. Wegner and his colleagues (1987) investigated thought 
suppression with experimental design. They introduced the “white bear 
paradigm” which involves trying not to think of white bear for five minutes 
either before or after a five-minute expression period. The findings revealed 
 11 
an increase in the number of thought of white bear during expressive period 
following suppression relative to that period preceding suppression period.  
Based on their research on suppression, they defined two steps in 
thought suppression process: one includes the operation of plans and 
strategies for thought suppression and the second is maintaining of thought 
suppression by checking whether the method of suppression works well. 
According to their view, increased susceptibility to unwanted thoughts after 
suppression derives broadly from the processes underlying the second step. 
The suppression of the thought of white bear depends on the selection of 
what is not white bear. Every thought during the suppression period is 
generated with a link to the thought of white bear. When subjects are 
allowed to think of anything, the most of the thoughts coming to mind are 
those recently viewed. Thinking of those thoughts in every time activates 
the implicit connection to the target thought. Therefore, every recent 
thought acts as a cue that primes the target thought. They proposed that 
narrowing such distracting thoughts to a particular thought rather than 
allowing the possibility of many of them will decrease the number of 
intrusive thoughts during expressive period. The result of the study was 
compatible to their proposal. When subjects were provided with a particular 
distracting thought (i.e. red Volkswagen) in order to get rid of the thoughts 
of white bear reported less post-suppression intrusion than those without a 
particular distraction. The “negative cueing” explanation, as called by 
Wegner and his colleagues (1987), for thought suppression effects is 
compatible with Freud’s (1915) explanation of repression process 
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suggesting that repressed thoughts stay in the unconscious by developing 
new connections.  
 Rebound effect of thought suppression has also been justified outside 
of the laboratory settings. For instance, in the study by Trinder and 
Salkovskis (as cited in Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000) individuals showed a 
similar rebound effect in their daily life when they tried to suppress their 
already existing intrusive thoughts. Thus, it can be concluded that the 
findings of experimental studies on thought suppression are adequate to 
explain suppression occurred in the real world.  
 It has been postulated that thought suppression underlies the 
development and maintenance of psychic problems, especially anxiety 
disorders. Threatening thoughts induce more motivations for suppression in 
order to keep the pleasurable state. The more one tries to suppress an 
unwanted thought, the less likely one finds opportunity to work through this 
thought and reconstruct it in a way so that it no longer provokes negative 
emotions. Therefore, to be suppressed thoughts turn to intrusive thoughts on 
which the individual feels out of control. Many studies have proved the role 
of thought suppression in the development and maintenance of 
psychopathology, particularly post traumatic stress disorder (e.g. Harvey 
and Bryant, 1998), obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g. Janeck and 
Calamari, 1999) and depression (e.g. Wenzlaff and Bates, 1998). Those 
studies suggested that individuals with such psychopathology suffer from 
personally relevant intrusive thoughts when they try to suppress them more 
than nonclinical individuals. Clear evidence indicating the relation of 
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thought suppression to the severity and duration of symptoms has been 
found.  
 The more threatening one finds a stimulus, the more s/he is inclined 
to avoid from it. On the other hand, it is not so easy to avoid highly 
emotional stimuli. For instance, Davies and Clark, (as cited in Wenzlaff & 
Wegner (2000) observed that emotional stimuli lead to an increased number 
of intrusions following a suppression period as compared to neutral stimuli. 
Cougle and his colleagues (2005) investigated the interactive effect of 
suppression and anxiety on the occurrence of unwanted, threat related 
thoughts. In their study, subjects with social anxiety tried harder to suppress 
the target thought (a personal social threat) when they were induced anxiety 
(anticipation of public speech). Accordingly, they showed an increased 
number of intrusions. However, in the absence of an anticipation of threat, 
no such increase in intrusion frequency was observed under suppression 
condition. This may exemplify that suppression of increased anxiety lead to 
more intrusions.     
 There are mixed findings in terms of the indication of post-rebound 
effect of suppression in the literature. One possibility of nonincreased 
intrusive thoughts after suppression in some occasions may be maintenance 
of suppression during the expression period or subjects’ unwillingness to 
report their intrusions. Geraertsa and his colleagues (2006) compared the 
short-term and long-term effect of suppression, with the expectation that the 
presented possibilities for the failure will be lessen in the long run. During 
the experiment, only repressive participants (highly defensive and low in 
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trait anxiety) did not show post-rebound effect. On the other hand, looking 
at a-7 day report of intrusive anxious thoughts, repressors were intruded 
more frequently than the other participant. Geraertsa et al. (2006) 
interpreted the results of the study such that “repressive coping enables 
individuals to avoid negative and trauma-related thoughts in the short run, 
but in the long run, repressive coping leads to intrusive thoughts about these 
negative targets” (p. 1458). Commonly, post rebound effect of suppression 
has most robustly been demonstrated when mental control was disrupted by 
a cognitive load during suppression, such as rehearsal of nine-digit number, 
imposition of time pressure, and etc. (e.g. Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998; Macrae, 
Bodenhausen, Milne, Ford, 1997, and Wegner & Erber, 1992). This topic 
will be discussed in the following section in more detail.   
 
1.3 Memory   
 “Memory refers to the persistence of learning in a state that can be 
revealed at a later time (Squire, as cited in Gazzaniga, Irvy, and Mangun, 
2002, p. 302). Hypothetically, memory includes three stages. First, 
information is encoded, then stored, and finally retrieved (Gazzaniga et al., 
2002). At the first place, memory is divided into two major types: short-
term memory and long-term memory. Short-term memory has short 
retention time (seconds or minutes), whereas in long-term memory 
information is stored for days or years (Gazzaniga et al., 2002).  
The main interest of the present paper is long-term memory. Long-
term memory also includes two subdivisions, each of which has differential 
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domain of learning, “neural architecture and developmental timetable” 
(Tulving, 1985).  Explicit/declarative memory involves a conscious process 
of retrieving information that was learned before. There are two kinds of 
explicit memory. Episodic memory is associated with past events, such as 
personal, autobiographical experiences. The other is called semantic 
memory which includes factual knowledge, such as world knowledge, 
object knowledge, and language knowledge, (Gazzaniga et al., 2002). 
Information stored in explicit memory system can be either linguistic or 
sensory, and it is organized by language, and so can be declared (Cozolino, 
2002).  
On the other hand, implicit memory involves an unconscious 
process. Four forms of implicit memory were identified: Procedural 
memory involves “motor (e.g. knowledge of how to ride a bike) and 
cognitive skills (e.g. acquisition of reading skills)” (Gazzaniga et al., 2002, 
p. 315). The second involves perceptual priming through which 
performance on a task is facilitated by an earlier experience without the 
awareness of the causes of such facilitation. (Gazzaniga et al., 2002). 
Another form of implicit memory involves classical conditioning and the 
final one involves nonassociative learning (e.g. habituation, and 
sensitization) (Gazzaniga et al., 2002). The information stored in implicit 
memory cannot be verbalized. Experiences are encoded fragmentally into 
implicit memory. It is activated by “subtle situational cues” in a reflexive 
manner. Information stored in implicit memory includes “habits”, “skills”, 
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“reflexive behaviors”, “conditional and emotional learning”, and 
“unconscious rule structures” (Cozolino, 2002). 
Neuroscience studies revealed that explicit and implicit memory are 
two distinct mechanisms. Studies with brain damaged patients showed clear 
evidence for intact implicit memory performance in the absence of explicit 
memory, and vice versa (for a review see Gazzaniga et al., 2002). Explicit 
memory primarily relies on the hippocampus and prefrontal lobe. On the 
other hand, different forms of implicit memory involve different brain 
regions. For instance perceptual priming (visual or auditory) is related to the 
right occipital lobe, procedural memory is placed on the basal ganglia and 
the cerebellum (a structure of subcortex), and emotional conditioning 
involve the amygdala (Gazzaniga et al., 2002). Simplistically and roughly, it 
has been hypothesized that explicit memory is primarily ruled by cortical 
regions of the brain (vertical analysis) and related to the left hemisphere 
activity (horizontal analysis). For implicit memory the opposite condition 
has been assumed (Cozolino, 2002).  
Many researchers have empirically demonstrated that although 
knowledge in implicit memory does not come to awareness, it still affects 
human reactions. For instance according to Damasio’s somatic marker 
hypothesis (1994) past experiences are associated with certain bodily 
emotional reactions within the memory system. When one is in a similar 
situation, these reactions are automatically activated even without conscious 
recollections of the past experience. Neither the cause of such bodily 
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sensations nor bodily sensations themselves may reach consciousness, but 
their influence can be seen in decisions of actions.  
 Another important feature of implicit memory is that the information 
stored within implicit memory system is invulnerable to the passage of time. 
This phenomenon has not been observed for explicit memory system. 
Mitchell (2006) demonstrated 17-year-persistence of information in implicit 
memory store. In this study, subjects’ implicit memory performance 
(assessed through picture-fragment identification test) was higher for the 
pictures that they saw 17 years ago for new pictures. No such difference was 
found among control subjects who were presented with none of these 
pictures before. The results are impression in terms of indications the 
persistence of perceptual priming effect over at least 17 years.    
 
1.3.1 Memory and Emotion 
Bower’s model (1981) attempts to explain the nature of relationship 
between memory and emotion.  According to this model emotions are 
represented by particular sets of nodes within the network. Along with the 
network and schema models, nodes of an event and nodes of the emotion 
are aroused together during the event, and develop connections. When 
emotional nodes are stimulated, this activation primes the nodes of 
associated events, and vice versa. As Barry, Naus, and Rehm (2004) 
conceptualizes, unconscious activation of an emotion or event within 
memory system (even those that are in implicit memory) may be explained 
through this process.  
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One of the important considerations within memory research is the 
effects of stress on memory system. On the face of stress, hypothalamus-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis is stimulated and thereby the secretion of stress 
hormones called glucocorticoids (GC) increase (Kandel, 1999). This 
increase blocks the functions of the hippocampus which has sensitive 
receptors to GC, which in turn leads to overactivation of the amygdala due 
to the lack of cortical inhibition (Sapolsky, 2004; LeDoux, 1998). Severe or 
prolonged stress causes impairments in memory system guided by 
hippocampus (i.e. explicit memory). Inability to remember traumatic 
memories is related to this mechanism. On the other hand information 
during the times of severe or prolonged stress is acquired through amygdala-
based implicit memory system. Furthermore, as LeDoux (1998) suggested, 
since the amygdala is free from the control of the medial prefrontal cortex, 
these unconscious memories become more resistant to extinction. In the 
study by Packard and Wingard (2004), injection of anxiogenic drugs into 
the amygdala leads rats to depend on procedural learning. Thus, they 
concluded that “increasing levels of emotional arousal, at least to a 
particular threshold, may selectively impair ‘‘cognitive’’ memory function, 
and thereby favor the use of ‘‘habit’’ memory systems” (p. 248). 
Although the events stored in the amygdala remain unconscious, 
they influence the conscious behaviors. In the study by Bechara and his 
colleagues (1995), a neutral stimulus (conditional stimulus) was associated 
with an aversive stimulus (such as electric shock- unconditional stimulus). 
Damage in the hippocampus did not interfere with normal conditional 
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physiological reactions, but led to inability to realize that their responses to 
the conditional stimulus are due to it was once associated with the 
unconditional stimulus. On the other hand, in the situation of amygdala 
damage, such patients could verbalize their anticipation that when 
conditional stimulus was presented, the unconditional stimulus would 
follow it.  However, no conditioned fear responses were observed (for a 
review see Phelps, 2006).  
Sapolsky (2004) summarized the neurobiological mechanism by 
which stress affects memory system. He claimed that increased secretion of 
GCs disrupts the growth and strengthening of the connection among 
neurons (synapses) within the hippocampus. Because memories are 
represented by synaptic configurations, in the absence of such synaptic 
stimulation, forgetting occurs.  
On the other hand, in the situations of mild stress, increased explicit 
memory performance is in place. It has been demonstrated by many studies 
that information with emotionally arousing connotations are more likely to 
be retrieved than nonemotional ones (Hamann, 2001). From evolutionary 
perspective, emotionally arousing stimuli more readily capture attention 
because they carry life saving value. Cognitively, emotional stimuli involve 
increased rehearsal, enhanced attention, and thus high elaboration (Hamann, 
2001). Specific neural and hormonal mechanisms also play important roles 
in enhancing effect of stress, such as a growth in synaptic connections 
triggered by mild increase in the secretion of GC.  
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1.4 Suppression and Memory 
1.4.1 Explicit Memory (recall and recognition) and Suppression 
A growing number of investigators have conducted studies in order 
to explore the effect of thought suppression on memory processes. For 
explicit memory performance, the findings are mixed. While some studies 
yielded enhancement effect of suppression on memory for the target stimuli 
others indicated its detrimental effects on memory. 
A substantial number of researches have demonstrated an association 
between suppression instructions and impaired memory performance for 
target material. Anderson and his colleagues (2004) explained the 
mechanism of this relationship such that “stopping retrieval of an unwanted 
memory impairs its later retention” (p. 232). They (2004) proposed a 
think/no think task to study thought suppression. In this study design 
subjects were first trained on word pairs, then presented with one of the 
words in pairs and asked either to think or not to think about its pair. 
Finally, they performed an unexpected memory task (cued recall). They 
found that to-be-suppressed items were recalled less than to-be thought 
items.  
Directed forgetting is another paradigm for making individuals get 
involved in suppression of unwanted thoughts. Similar to thought 
suppression, in directed forgetting paradigm subjects are first presented with 
the stimulus to-be-suppressed/forgotten, and then asked to suppress/forget 
it. A typical directed forgetting method (Bjork, 1970) involves the 
presentation of a list of words. After the presentation of each word or a 
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group of words subjects are instructed to either remember or forget it/them. 
At the end, subjects were provided with an unexpected memory task (recall 
or recognition) which was composed of both to-be-remembered and to be 
forgotten words. It was demonstrated that ‘forget’ instruction was associated 
with impaired memory performance as compared to ‘remember’ instruction. 
Common explanation for such results has been retrieval inhibition of forget 
items (e.g. Geiselman, Bjork, & Fishman, 1983).  
 Thought suppression and directed forgetting involve voluntary 
mechanisms in order to avoid target thought. Inhibition of a thought can also 
be created involuntarily. Retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm is an 
example of such an unintentional process (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). 
This paradigm depends on the notion that associated items compete with 
each other for being recalled. When one item is attempted to retrieve, other 
associated items are activated too. If one particular thought is retrieved by a 
cue and not the competing thought, the competing thought becomes 
inhibited and is forgotten. Storm, Bjork and Bjork (2005) tested this 
paradigm on recall for human traits. The associated traits that were not 
retrieved during the study phase recalled less than even control items (that 
were not presented before). Wessel and Hauer (2006) demonstrated retrieval 
induced forgetting effect on autobiographical memories, and Barnier, Hung, 
and Conway (2004) did on emotional memories.  
Interestingly, even simply engaging in suppression of emotional 
expressions resulted in impaired memory performance, just as involving 
self-distraction (Richards and Gross, 2005). Self distraction is another way 
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of inhibiting a particular thought by thinking alternative thoughts other than 
the target, i.e. distracters. Individuals who tried either to suppress their facial 
expressions or to think about something else when they were watching a-64-
sec. surgical film showed a worse recognition performance for the film than 
those who received no instructions. Importantly, memory performance even 
got poorer as people tried harder to suppress.  
The authors of such studies explained the underlying mechanism of 
detrimental effect of suppression based on the “resource depletion theory” 
(Wegner & Erber, 1992). For instance according to the Easterbrook’s (1959) 
cue-utilization hypothesis, emotions and some form of emotion regulation 
strategies deprive attentional resources and leave little of it for memory 
processes. Likewise, as Wegner and his colleagues (1987) indicated, the 
cognitive control (operator and monitoring process) involved in suppression 
process demands considerable amount of cognitive resources.  
Evidence for the notion that decreased memory performance 
following suppression is because suppression process expends the available 
cognitive recourses for memory process comes from the study by Klein and 
Bratton (2007). In their experiment, they varied the complexity of cognitive 
task (sentence verification task) and memory type (nonemotional, 
nonpersonal negative and personal negative memories). After thinking about 
the target thought for three minutes, subjects were asked to either suppress 
or think about the target thought for the next three minutes. Afterwards, they 
were provided with one of the sentence verification tasks (low, moderate, or 
high complexity). They found that suppression is related to an increase in 
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response time especially when the complexity of the cognitive task is high. 
These results indicate that thought suppression costs on cognitive resources. 
Rachman (as cited in Klein and Bratton, 2007) stated that emotional 
stimuli are cognitively more demanding in order to be suppressed. “Recent 
research on affect and cognition suggests that emotions with negatively high 
emotional valence tend to promote detail-oriented, attentive and piecemeal 
information processing style” (Fiedler, as cited in Wyland & Forgas, 2007, 
p. 1515), which is similar to the process operating in suppression (an 
attentive and focused thinking about alternative, distracting topics) (Wegner 
et al., 1987). Nevertheless, this kind of operational style has even greater 
cost on cognitive recourses. In the study by Klein and Bratton (2007) 
detrimental effect of suppression on cognitive functions was highlighted 
when suppression target involved negative personal experiences. 
Depue, Banich and Curan (2006) investigated how suppression of 
emotional and nonemotional information affects differently memory 
performance by using think/no think paradigm. Along with previous 
research, they identified that emotional targets were remembered better than 
neutral targets when they were not to be suppressed. On the other hand, this 
aspect of emotional information makes it harder to be suppressed; thus 
emotional information needs greater cognitive control (i.e. cognitive 
resource) to be suppressed. As indicated by the findings of their study, to be 
suppressed emotional information was recalled less than to be suppressed 
neutral information.  
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It is important to note that there is no sufficient empirical study 
showing a single underlying mechanism that mediates the relationship 
between intentional forgetting/suppressing attempts and memory systems. 
Alternatively, as Fleck and his colleagues (2001) suggested, retrieval and/or 
encoding deficits may account for impaired memory performance following 
suppression attempts. In their study with directed forgetting paradigm, 
participants were provided with an interference task either during the study 
phase or memory task. Recognition process was found to be mainly 
mediated by selective encoding (relevant vs. irrelevant) rather than retrieval 
inhibition. Another explanation for the effect of suppression on memory 
systems is that engaging in intentional forgetting deprives opportunity for 
rehearsal of the target thought. Rehearsal is important for the duration of 
maintenance of newly acquired information in short-term memory. Longer 
maintenance of information in short term memory ensures the transference 
of information to long-term memory (Gazaniga et al, 2002). Such 
deprivation of rehearsal by suppression task may result in fading out the 
target thought within memory.  
On the other hand Sherman, Stroessner, Loftus and Deguzman 
(1997) provided evidence for enhanced memory performance for to-be-
suppressed stimuli. In their study participants listened to a group of 
stereotypical and non-stereotypical features of a social group in order to 
form impressions. Participants who were told to suppress their previous 
stereotypes about the group showed a highlighted accuracy of recognition 
for stereotypic features as compared to non-stereotypic features. Moreover, 
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their performance was higher than the participants with no suppression 
instruction.  
Macrae and his colleagues (1997) claimed that detrimental effect of 
suppression occurs only when there are plenty of cognitive resources for the 
completion of a successful suppression process. In their experiment on 
suppression of stereotypic information, participants who were primed for to-
be-forgotten items previously, did not exhibit a directed forgetting effect. 
They explained this phenomenon such that attentional valence of the target 
was increased by priming, and such a highly demanding stimulus required a 
greater cognitive resource to be suppressed. Similarly, an improved recall 
performance for to-be-forget items was observed when participants engaged 
in a simultaneous cognitive task during suppression of to-be-forgotten 
items. Engaging in a simultaneous cognitive task during suppression is 
thought to disrupt a successful suppression process by depleting the 
available cognitive resources.     
Along with Wegner’s (1987; 1992) proposal of two-step mechanism 
in suppression process, Macrae and his colleagues (1997, p.716) explained 
these results based on the attentional inhibitory mechanism operating in 
suppression process which requires plenty of cognitive energy. When 
cognitive resources are depleted by an ongoing demanding cognitive 
activity, suppression process fails, which results in intrusions of target 
stimuli in working memory (i.e. rehearsal effect) (Macrae et al., 1997). 
Therefore, just like the process underlying the post-rebound effect, a 
decreased operator activity combined with an increased monitoring activity 
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amplifies the accessibility of recollections of target stimuli. Failure in 
inhibiting the unwanted thought accompanied by highlighted attention leads 
to enhanced memory performance (Wenzlaff, & Wegner, 2000). 
Wegner, Quillian and Houston (1996) pointed that it is not the 
accurate retrieval of content, but the accurate retrieval of the sequence of 
target episode that is affected by suppression attempt. They presented 
subjects with nonemotional film clip either to be suppressed or thought 
about during the day. The third group of the sample received no instruction 
for thinking. After 5 hours, their memory for the content of the film and the 
sequence of the film scenes were assessed. Neither recall nor recognition 
performance was impaired or improved due to the suppression instruction as 
compared to thinking and no- instruction groups. On the other hand, 
suppression group made more mistakes when retrieving the order of the film 
than did the other groups. Furthermore, suppressed group was more likely to 
indicate fragmented memories for the film rather than having a continuous 
image of it. The findings of the Rassin’s (2001) study were parallel to 
Wegner’s study. No considerable effect of thought suppression on the 
accuracy of the recollection of target story was found. Furthermore, memory 
representations of the suppression group were more like snapshots than 
those of the thinking group, but not than those of the no-instruction group.  
A large number of studies have investigated the effect of intentional 
forgetting/suppression on memory process. On the other hand, there have 
been discrepancies among the findings of these studies. Some possible 
explanations of such discrepancies can be listed as follows: 
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First of all, variation in experimental procedure may account for the 
mixed results. For instance, thought suppression and directed forgetting are 
two methods to initiate forgetting. However there are substantial differences 
between these two paradigms. At the first place, the difference between 
thought suppression and directed forgetting is that in directed forgetting 
paradigm there are both to-be-forgotten and to-be-remembered materials, 
whereas in thought suppression paradigm there are experimental groups or 
time periods for suppression in order to make comparisons. Furthermore, in 
thought suppression paradigm subject is to report the intrusions of target 
thought. Directed forgetting usually results in increased retrieval of 
‘remember’ items compared to ‘forget’ items. However, thought 
suppression usually increases intrusions of to-be-forgotten material, but for 
memory performance the nature of its effect has not been clear yet. 
(Whetstone & Cross, 1998). According to Whetstone and Cross (1998), the 
difference between thought suppression and directed forgetting paradigms 
in terms of memory performance results from monitoring process that 
operates in thought suppression and associated with the intrusion- report 
instruction. When they tested their hypothesis, the results yielded that 
directed forgetting effect was not observed in the presence of the report 
instruction. In the study conducted by Wegner and his colleagues (1996), 
subjects in suppression group were instructed not to think about the film 
clip, they had just watched, for the following 5 hours; and they were not 
asked to report the intrusions during the day. No difference in memory 
performance for the content of the film clip was observed.  
 28 
Another reason for inconsistent findings in intentional 
forgetting/suppression studies may be the variation in the characteristics of 
target material. For example, suppression of a single item rather than an 
episode generated different results. Even thought there is no direct 
comparison study, suppression of a single thought/item is more likely to be 
associated with improved memory for particular thought (e.g. Wegner et al., 
1987), whereas suppression of an episode is more inclined to produce 
memory impairments (e.g. Wegner et al., 1996). Furthermore, attempts to 
suppress stimuli that capture more attention, such as being highly emotional, 
personally relevant or complicated, result in reduced memory performance 
as compared to suppression of attentionally less demanding stimuli (e.g. 
Rassin, 2001; Depue et al., 2006; and Klein, Bratton, 2007). However, this 
hypothesis has been challenged by Macrae’s et al. (1997) finding that 
increase in attentional valence via priming resulted in difficulties to 
suppress that target. On the other hand, such discrepancy may result from 
the failure of successful suppression induction in the study by Macrae and 
his colleagues. Macrae and his colleagues (1997) did not control whether 
subjects successfully manage not to think of to-be-forgotten items. 
Demanding targets are hard to be suppressed and thus associated with 
increased numbers of intrusion. Because of that a particular attention for 
checking the level of suppression success should be devoted in order to 
make more definite conclusions.  
Finally, type of retrieval task (recall vs. recognition) may be 
responsible for the divergence in suppression/forgetting studies. Although 
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some studies identified no difference in sensitivity of recall and recognition 
memory (e.g. Wegner et al., 1996), most of the studies indicated that recall 
memory is more vulnerable to forget instructions than recognition memory 
(e.g. Whetstone and Cross, 1998). As well as the variations in retrieval 
process as presented above, suppression effect on later memory 
performance may be mediated by factors influencing encoding and/or 
retention process.  
Paradoxically, it has been suggested that the inadequacy of cognitive 
resources is responsible for both enhanced accessibility of the target thought 
and impaired memory for it. Therefore, poor memory performance after 
suppression might occur only when suppression of the target thought is 
successful, that is in the absence of intrusive thoughts during the 
suppression period.  
   
1.4.2 Familiarity and Recollection Memories, and Suppression  
While undermining effect of thought suppression on memory is 
commonly identified by researchers, the nature of this effect relatively 
received little attention. For example, according to the dual-process theory 
of recognition there are two cognitive processes underling recognition 
memory, i.e. two types of recognition memory (Yonelinas, 2002). One type 
of recognition judgment is based on conscious recollection of information. 
Recollection involves a controlled, detailed process through which 
information is retrieved with its context and associations. In that sense, 
recollection is similar to the process operating in recall memory (Yonelinas, 
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2002). The other recognition judgment mainly depends on a sense of 
familiarity without recollection of any details or associations about 
information. Familiarity relies on the mechanism that automatically checks 
whether the target information matches with the stored information in 
memory (Yonelinas, 2002). Due to its automatic nature, familiarity is more 
immune to memory impairments. For instance, it has been showed that 
whereas disruptions in attention when learning a material impaired 
recollection considerably, judgments based on familiarity were affected to a 
smaller extent (Jacoby & Kelly, as cited in Parker, Relph, & Dagnall, 2008).   
Remember-know paradigm developed by Tulving, (1985) is the 
mainly used method to find out the nature of contributions to recognition 
memory. In this method, subjects are to indicate whether they retrieve any 
detail related to the recognized item (remember response), or they are just 
sure about seeing the item before without any recollections (know 
response). Remember responses represent recollection, and know responses 
represent familiarity process. Familiarity process is just like that sometimes 
we are sure about knowing a person before but we are unable to remember 
any detail about him such as his name, the context we meet him, and etc.  
Remember-know judgments do not reflect memory confidence. In order to 
prevent misuse of know judgment as indication of guessing, and to allow 
participant to make more accurate judgments Eldridge, Sarfatti, and 
Knowlton (2002) included a “guess” alternative.   
It has been demonstrated that familiarity and recollection rely on 
different brain regions. While damage in hippocampus was associated with 
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impaired recollection, damage that extended to surrounding structures in the 
medial and interior temporal lobe (e.g. parahippocampal gyrus) was 
associated with impairment in both recollection and familiarity (for a review 
see Aggleton & Brown, 1999). A substantial literature, as reviewed in 
Yonelinas (2002, p.471), consistently indicated that “the hippocampus and 
the prefrontal lobe is critical for recollection, whereas the surrounding 
temporal lobe regions are critical for familiarity”. More specifically Blaxton 
and Theodore (1997) identified laterality of familiarity and recollection. The 
deficit in left hemisphere temporal lobe was related to lower recollection, 
while the deficit in right hemisphere temporal lope was associated with 
lower familiarity. 
Yonelinas (2002) proposed that recollection is quite similar to recall, 
thus what affects recall performance can affect recollection performance. 
For example, attention deprivation during retrieval reduces recall memory, 
but not recognition. Along with this information, recollection memory may, 
too, be vulnerable to deprivation of attentional resources (for a review see 
Yonelinas, 2002). However, according to the author’s knowledge this 
proposal has not been tested yet with remember-know procedure. Spitzer 
and Bauml (2007) applied retrieval induced forgetting paradigm on 
remember-know judgments in order to demonstrate the retrieval induced 
effect on recollection. Unexpectedly, they observed no impairment in 
recollection of unpracticed items as compared to control items in retrieval 
inducing forgetting, but an expected decrease in general memory strength 
was found. Nonetheless, Verde (2004) showed a detrimental effect of 
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practicing a particular item during retrieval on recollection of the 
unpracticed associated item.   
 To sum up, under the light of these findings, recognition memory is 
composed of two independent processes which involve different domain of 
cognitive processes, different neurobiological structures and different level 
of susceptibility to external factors. Inconsistencies among the studies 
examining the effect of forget/suppress instructions on recognition memory 
can be explained by the dual process nature of recognition memory. It is be 
possible that different individuals may predominantly rely on one type of 
process rather than the other when deciding whether they saw the item 
previously.   
 
1.4.3 Implicit Memory and Suppression 
Freud suggested long before repressed information may fade out 
within explicit memory, but not within implicit memory, thus it still keeps 
its influence over mind. As many studies have indicated a decrease in 
explicit memory performance after suppression, a reverse condition has 
been observed for implicit memory performance.  
The proposal that thought suppression is associated with an increase 
in implicit memory performance has been proved by the studies measuring 
unconscious cognitive processes, and behavioral and physiological 
responses (for a review see Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). For instance 
Wegner and his colleagues (1990) demonstrated an increase in skin 
conductance level associated with suppression of an exciting thought. 
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During the monitoring of subjects’ thoughts over 30 minutes under 
suppression condition, intrusions of exciting thought into the consciousness 
were associated with elevated skin conductance level whereas under think 
condition no such a relationship was observed. These results revealed that 
although suppressed thoughts disappear from consciousness for a while, 
they are very likely to be followed by uncontrolled intrusions into the mind 
without losing their emotional connotations.  
Furthermore, Wegner and Smart (1997) identified a “deep cognitive 
activation” buried in unconscious mechanisms. That is, even though people 
may not be aware of their suppressed thoughts; the influences of those 
thoughts are evident on the tasks involving unconscious processes. For 
example, the sentence unscrambling task is a method for assessing 
unconscious processes. With this procedure Wenzlaff & Bates (1998) 
demonstrated the role of suppressed depressive thoughts in the development 
of risky behaviors. The results of the study indicated that when high risk 
takers were successfully engaged in thought suppression (i.e. in the absence 
of a cognitive load during the sentence unscrambling task), they showed no 
evidence for depressive thoughts. However, they revealed an increased 
number of depressive statements when they were imposed a cognitive load 
during the sentence unscrambling task (a way of deprivation of the 
opportunity for successful suppression) (Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998).  Stroop 
task is another common method for measuring implicit memory. Wegner 
and Erber (1992) demonstrated Stroop interference for suppressed thoughts. 
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That is, participants were slower in indicating the color of to-be suppressed 
targets under cognitive load as compared to target-unrelated words.  
The studies cited above mainly illustrate unconscious intrusions of 
suppressed thoughts. More direct evidence for conservation of suppressed 
thoughts within implicit memory came from McKinney and Woodward 
(2004). They identified directed forgetting effect in all kinds of explicit 
memory tasks (free recall, cued recall, and recognition), but not in the 
implicit memory task (word completion task).  
Resistance of implicit memory to directed forgetting effect was also 
indicated by Storm, Bjork and Bjork (2005). They found a typical directed 
forgetting effect on recall for human traits associated with different pictures. 
However inhibiting particular information and making the associated one 
more ready to come into the mind even involuntarily did not change 
subjects’ impressions formed previously. Along with the repression theory, 
as Bjork and Bjork (e.g. 2003) suggested in their research on directed 
forgetting, even though there is no conscious access to the specific 
information, its impact is still obvious on judgments and behaviors.  
Fleck and his colleagues (2001) found directed forgetting effect on 
implicit (assessed through lexical decision task) memory as well as on 
explicit memory (assessed through recognition task). More specifically, to-
be remembered words were identified as word vs. non-word more quickly in 
implicit task, and recognized more accurately and faster during the explicit 
task. Moreover, they demonstrated different underlying mechanisms of 
directed forgetting effect in two memory systems. According to the results 
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disruptions in retrieval mechanism by an interference task eradicated the 
directing forgetting effect, whereas those in encoding process did not 
diminish directed forgetting effect in implicit memory. Therefore they 
concluded that retrieval deficit has a greater contribution to directed 
forgetting in implicit memory. More specifically, “directed forgetting in 
implicit memory probably results from the differential excitation of 
Remember and Forget cued word representations at retrieval”, and is not 
because of “retrieval inhibition of irrelevant information” (p. 217). On the 
other hand, in recognition process it is encoding regulations rather than 
retrieval that are responsible for directed forgetting effect. 
 
1.5 Neurobiological Foundation of Thought Suppression 
Neuropsychoanalysis is a relatively new field in the scientific arena 
investigating the neurobiological foundations of the psychoanalytic 
constructs. Therefore, the followers of this school study to provide 
psychoanalysis a scientific setting. In an attempt to find the neurobiological 
mechanisms underlying repression, different views have been generated by 
psychoanalytic authors. Although they tried to elaborate their hypotheses 
with clinical evidence (especially from patients with brain damage), many 
of them still lack direct experimental evidence.  
Psychoanalytic concepts of conscious and unconscious memory are 
similar to explicit and implicit memory concepts of cognitive science, 
respectively; nevertheless they are not the same (Cozolino, 2002).  
Depending on the type of memory, such as sensory, motor, emotional, and 
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semantic, different brain regions are responsible for different types of 
memory (McCarty, as cited in Cozolino, 2002). “Systems of memory bridge 
top-down and left-right pathways” (Cozolino, 2002, p.91). Top-down 
pathway involves cortical and subcortical structures of the brain. While 
explicit memory systems lie within the layers of the cortical and 
hippocampal areas of the brain that are present only in higher-order living 
things and developed after birth; implicit memory systems lie in the 
primitive structure of the brain that are developed from birth (Cozolino, 
2002).  
Anderson and his colleagues (2004) looked at the brain activities of 
subjects though fMRI under suppression and no suppression conditions in 
order to find out the neural mechanisms underlying suppression. Increased 
activity was observed in the brain regions responsible for executive control, 
particularly the dorsalateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), during suppression 
in comparison with retrieval episodes. The more the DLPFC activation is, 
the more memory inhibition. Interestingly, suppression success was 
associated with increased hippocampal activation. That is, during the final 
memory task there was more activation in the hippocampus when to-be-
suppressed words were forgotten than when they were remembered. On the 
other hand, a reverse phenomenon was in place for to-be-thought words. 
That is to say, there was more activation in the hippocampus when to-be-
thought words were remembered. These findings indicated that “the 
hippocampus and DLPFC interact during the attempts to suppress 
recollection of an unwanted experience” (Anderson et al., 2004, p. 234).  
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Another neuropsychoanalytic conceptualization of repression is left-
right pathway. During evolution, left and right hemispheres of the brain 
have been specialized for different mental functions. It has been claimed 
that verbal activities, analytical and serial information processing are 
located primarily on the left hemisphere. On the other hand, functions such 
as nonverbal and perceptual activities, synthesizing, and holistic processing 
are dominated by the right hemisphere (Carlson, 2004). It has been 
suggested that the right hemisphere has much more connections to the 
limbic system, the subcortical region of the brain, than the left hemisphere 
(Cozolino, 2002). However, for most of the brain functions neural circuits 
of left and right sides work collaboratively. “When we speak of functions of 
the right or left brain, we are more accurately referring to functions that are 
represented more fully in one hemisphere than the other” (Cozolino, 2002, 
p. 106). In fact more complex, high-level mental functions, such as 
empathy, attribution of intention, comprehending stories, and appreciating 
humor, require well coordination among different neural circuits distributed 
throughout the left and right hemispheres of the brain (e.g. Gallagher & 
Frith, 2003). Corpus callosum, a large bundle of neural fibers, is the brain 
region primarily responsible for interconnecting the two hemispheres of the 
brain so that we have unified perceptions and memories (Carlson, 2004).  
Some of the psychoanalytic researches (e.g. Galin, as cited in Solms 
& Turnbull, 2002; and Schore, 2005) argue that psychodynamic conscious 
is posited in the verbal left brain and the psychodynamic unconscious is 
related to the nonverbal right brain. According to this view, the right 
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hemisphere, which is intact from early months of life, is primarily 
specialized for implicit information processing and the left hemisphere is 
mainly responsible for conscious processing (e.g. Hugdahl, as cited in 
Schore, 2005; and Happaney, Zelazo, & Struss, 2004). Cooperation between 
the functions of the two hemispheres results in a “coherent, continuous, and 
unified sense of self” (Schore, 2005, p. 831). In line with this proposal, 
repression is viewed as the result of the “functional disconnection” between 
hemispheres, and the corpus callosum is the region of the brain responsible 
for repression. (Solms & Turnbull, 2002). In that sense repression may be 
thought in the analogy of a blockage preventing the connections between 
certain information stored within the left and right hemispheres, thus 
disrupting an integrated sense of self. Likewise, Freud (1915) 
conceptualized repression as the lack of verbal representation from certain 
motives, thoughts or emotions; and talking is a very effective way of 
reconnecting verbal representations to the associated targets. 
Along with split-brain studies (a surgical operation of cutting corpus 
callosum for treatment of epilepsy), which include differential presentation 
of particular stimuli to either the left or the right hemisphere, Solms and 
Turnbull (2002) suggested that the left hemisphere is “reflexively 
conscious” that is “being able to reflexively recall and articulate something” 
and different from “core consciousness (being aware of something)” (p. 
247). Solms and Turnbull argued that we cannot simply equate the verbal 
activities of the left hemisphere to psychoanalytic term of consciousness, 
which include all executive ego functions such as, reality testing, and 
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coping. As seen in the case with left midtemporal damage, although the 
patient is unable to follow others’ speech as well as her thoughts, she 
somehow maintained her ego functions. Furthermore, in contrast to 
expectations, patients with right hemisphere deficits are not more rational or 
realistic than normal population (Solms & Turnbull, 2002).  
To sum up, identifying the right hemisphere as the unconscious and 
the left hemisphere as the conscious may be misleading. Nevertheless, we 
can assume that while the right hemisphere is more related to implicit 
mechanisms, the left hemisphere is more related to explicit processes. And 
their cooperation is important for sense of integrated experiences.  
DeBellis and his colleagues (1999) identified a relationship between 
early child abuse and a reduction in the size of corpus callosum. They 
investigated the brain scans of 44 maltreated subjects’ suffering from PTSD 
symptoms compared with 61 normal individuals. More specifically a 
significant correlation between increased dissociative symptoms and 
decreased corpus callosum size was observed.  
A growing research has been attempting to investigate the role of 
interhemispheric integration in memory processes. The results of studies 
with neuroimagining techniques, behavioral measurements, or patients 
having particular brain damage have underlined the interhemispheric basis 
of episodic memories. The conclusion of these studies is that while 
encoding of episodic memory was related to increased left hemisphere 
activity, retrieval mainly depended on right hemisphere activities. In 
contrast, semantic memory involved unilateral activation of left hemisphere 
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(Tulving, Kapur, Craik, Moscovitch, & Houle, 1994). Furthermore, while 
split-brain patients had intact implicit memory, their episodic recognition 
memory was disrupted (Cronin-Golomb, Gabrieli, and Keane, 1996).  
Christman and Propper (2001) found unilateral basis of implicit 
memory and bilateral basis of explicit episodic memory by applying 
behavioral techniques. They presented study stimuli (i.e. word strings) to 
different visual fields (right vs. left) of participants during encoding and 
retrieval. When the letters were presented to the opposite hemispheres 
during encoding and retrieval, an improved recognition performance was 
obtain. On the other hand, when letters were presented to the right visual 
fields (i.e. left hemisphere) both during encoding and retrieval, the speed of 
subjects in the lexical decision task (a way of assessing implicit memory) 
received more advantage (Christman & Propper, 2001).   
Inducing bilateral, horizontal, saccadic eye movements is another 
behavioral method associated with increased hemispheric integration. Bakan 
& Svorad, (as cited in Christman & Propper, 2001) identified the 
equalization of levels of activation in the left and right hemispheres 
following bilateral eye movements. It is proposed that “equalized levels of 
activation in the two hemispheres facilitate interhemispheric integration, 
[because] “if the two hemispheres display different levels of activation, it 
may be difficult for the less activated hemisphere to “keep pace” and 
interact efficiently with the more active hemisphere” (e.g. Christman, 
Garvey, Propper, & Phaneuf, 2003, p. 222). Along with this argument, 
neurophysiological studies demonstrated increased electroencephalograph 
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(EEG) coherence when individuals perform a task which is operated by the 
structures of both two hemispheres. However, EEG coherence was not 
observed when performing tasks which include unilateral brain functioning 
(e.g. Morrison-Stewart, Velikonja, Corning, & Williamson, as cited in 
Christman, et al. 2003). A similar brain processing including increased EEG 
coherence was detected in during REM sleep, especially in the presence of 
horizontal eye movements (e.g. Dionne, as cited in Christman, et al. 2003). 
Based on the indication of these findings, a relationship between bilateral 
eye movements and increased interhemispheric interaction has been 
suggested (e.g. Christman, et al. 2003). 
In the study by Christman and his colleagues (2003), an 
improvement in episodic memory performance (recognition of previously 
presented words and recall of autobiographical memories) was observed 
following engaging in 30 second-bilateral horizontal saccadic eye 
movement as compared to no eye movement and other types of eye 
movement conditions. No effect on implicit memory performance (word 
fragment completion) was observed.  
Another common way of behavioral assessment of interhemispheric 
integration is measuring the degree of handedness. The assumption of the 
relationship between handedness and interhemispheric process is based on 
the findings which reveal a larger corpus callosum size in mixed-handed 
individuals (Witelson, 1985). As the size of the corpus callosum increases, 
so does the neural transmission across the corpus callosum as a result of 
equilibrating the activation between the two hemispheres (Liederman, 
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1998). It was found that the increase in interhemispheric EEG coherence 
coincides with the increase in the myelinization and maturation of the 
corpus callosum (between the ages of 2 and 7) (Yakovlev & Lecours, as 
cited in Christman, et al. 2003).  Under the light of these findings, the 
corpus callosum may be the structure of the brain that mediates the 
coherence of the activation in the two cerebral hemispheres, thus regulating 
interhemispheric integration (Christman, et al. 2003).   
Christman, Propper and Brown (2006) demonstrated a relationship 
between interhemispheric integration and the onset of childhood amnesia. 
The results of the study yielded that mixed handed participants retrieved 
episodic memories at an earlier age than strongly right handed individuals. 
Moreover, when the interhemispheric integration of strong handers was 
facilitated through bilateral, saccadic eye movement, they recalled earlier 
memories than control groups. This finding also indicates the effect of 
increased interhemispheric integration is especially robust during retrieval.  
Propper and Christmant (2004) indicated no effect of hemispheric 
integration on recognition performance. On the other hand, while 
recognitions based on explicit recollections were associated with being 
mixed handed, familiarity based recognition was higher in strongly right-
handed individuals. Nevertheless, Parker, Sarah and Dagnall (2008) 
indicated similar results with bilateral, eye movement method; they also 
indicated improved recognition performance as well as recall performance. 
Similarly Lyle, McCabe and Roediger (2008) demonstrated the advantage 
of being mixed handed for verbal paired associate recall performance and 
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source memory performance (which involve hemispheric integration), but 
not for face recognition performance and forward digit span performance 
(which involve unilateral brain activation). 
 
1.6. Present Study 
 
Previous studies revealed inconsistent results for the effect thought 
controlling on explicit and implicit memories. It has been demonstrated that 
while suppression resulted in deterioration in these memory performances in 
some cases, an enhancement was observed in the other cases. And some of 
them indicated no effect. The majority of these studies were conducted by 
using directed forgetting paradigm. Although thought suppression and 
directed forgetting paradigms have some commonalities, such as avoidance 
from the target thought and/or turning attention from the target by using 
distracters, they are not identical (Whetstone & Cross, 1998). Thought 
suppression paradigm is more compatible with psychoanalytic term of 
repression than directed forgetting is. Along with the purpose of the present 
study, namely bridging psychoanalysis and experimental indications, the 
particular interest of the present study is to explore the effect of thought 
suppression on memory systems. According to my knowledge, there are few 
studies directly investigating the relationship between intentional avoidance 
from anxiety-related thoughts and the nature of the subsequent memory for 
those thoughts. Rather primary aim of the existing studies is to examine the 
frequency of intrusive thoughts following suppression. Moreover, while 
most of the previous studies included verbal items to be suppressed, 
suppression of visual materials have received relatively less attention. 
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Nevertheless, visual stimuli are more capable of inducing emotional 
reactions, and in real world to be suppressed thoughts do not include only 
verbal stimuli, but also visual stimuli. Therefore, the first aim of the present 
study is to investigate the nature of the effects produced by suppression of 
anxiety-related visual stimuli on different memory systems. In line with 
resource depletion hypothesis, as well as rehearsal disruption explanation, 
impairment in explicit memory performance is expected. On the other hand, 
due to the high emotional valence of the target stimuli, participants are 
expected to have difficulties to suppress them successfully. On the basis of 
the literature, demanding materials consume more of the available 
resources, thus they are related with greater cognitive impairments for 
additional mental tasks. However, such situation is expected only when 
suppression attempts of individuals succeeded. On the other hand, 
demanding materials are difficult to be avoided; therefore they are more 
open to the opportunity for rehearsal through intrusions. Under the condition 
of suppression failure, along with the priming explanation for rebound 
effect, an enhancement in memory performance after suppression is 
expected (1st hypothesis).   
As a second hypothesis regarding explicit memory systems, a greater 
suppression influence is expected for recollection based recognition 
memory as compared to familiarity based recognition memory. Because 
recollection involves a controlled, detailed processing for developing 
associations between target stimuli and its context, it requires more 
cognitive work. Suppression of the target is thought to disrupt the process of 
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association-generation, depriving the person from the opportunity for 
working through the target thought. On the other hand, familiarity is mainly 
based on automatic processes and that feature is expected to protect it from 
adverse effect of suppression.  
Similar to familiarity, implicit memory system relies on 
unintentional, effortless mechanisms. While distracters lead to the fading of 
explicit pathways of conscious retrieval, automatic monitoring process 
keeps priming the target thought. Accordingly, the third hypothesis of the 
study is that in the suppression condition an increase in implicit memory 
performance, or at least no change, is anticipated.  
Previous studies identified hemispheric lateralization of episodic 
memory. Because of the bilateral nature of episodic memories, they are 
facilitated by equalized level of activation in two cerebral hemispheres. The 
other attempt of the present study is to find out any effects of thought 
suppression on decreased sense of integrated memories via decreasing the 
cooperation between the two hemispheres of the brain. In the present study, 
suppression is thought to involve a selective blockage in the corpus 
callosum that prevents the integration of target-related information within 
the left and the right hemispheres. In the present study the degree of 
handedness (mixed vs. strong) was assumed an indirect measure of 
interhemispheric interaction given the evidence that mixed handedness is 
associated with larger size of corpus callosum. A larger size of corpus 
callosum is thought to be an indication of greater interhemispheric 
integration (i.e. increased cerebral activation coherence). Because the 
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majority of the population is right-handed and in order to prevent a potential 
confound, only right-handed people were included in the present study. To 
sum up, as the forth hypothesis, greater impairment in explicit memory 
performance following suppression is hypothesized for mixed-handed 
individuals as compared to strongly right-handed individuals. This is 
because mixed handed individuals’ benefit of increased hemispheric 
cooperation for episodic memory is assumed to be reduced under 
suppression condition, leading a greater cost for mixed-handed people. 
Furthermore, the most adverse effect of thought suppression for mixed 
handed individuals is expected to be on recollection based recognition 
memory (5th hypothesis). This is because familiarity was found to include 
semantic representations that mainly rely on intrahemispheric processes. 
The final hypothesis regarding the second aim involves a similar prediction 
for implicit memory performance, due to the unilateral basis of implicit 
memory (6th hypothesis).  
The final aim of the study is to figure out the factors, such as 
suppression and degree of handedness, that affect the way we perceive 
negativity in the external world. As the seventh hypothesis of the study, 
suppression is not expected to reduce the negative valence of photos that 
participants perceived. Not to think about something distressing for a while 
would not probably moderate the way we feel when we later encounter it. 
As soon as we manage to avoid distressing thought and related feelings we 
may not experience distressing at conscious level. However, once it is 
reminded in some way, the associated feelings probably emerge again. 
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Furthermore, a healthy way of emotion regulation involves the interaction of 
different mental functions, namely the interaction of different structures of 
the left and right hemisphere.  Therefore, mixed-handedness is hypothesized 
to be related to better regulation of emotions through hemispheric 
integration. Campos and his colleagues (2004) suggested that emotion 
regulation involves not only the processes following the elicitation of an 
emotion, but also the processes preceding it. Along with these arguments, 
mixed-handed individuals are expected to perceive the external world less 
negatively than strongly right-handed individuals (8th hypothesis). 
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Chapter 2: Method 
 
 
2.1 Participants 
 One hundred-seventy-eight right handed undergraduates volunteered 
in this experiment in exchange for course credit in the psychology courses.  
Participants were selected on the basis of some criteria assessed through a 
questionnaire (see Appendix B). Participants who were clinical (using drug 
and/or applying therapy for a particular psychological or neurological 
disorder) more than one month during the last year and/or at the moment 
they were taking the experiment were excluded from the study. Nineteen of 
the sample did not fulfill at least one of these criteria so they were 
discarded. Furthermore, nine of them did not follow suppression instruction 
at all, and 10 of them seemed as if they did not understand the memory task 
they are applied. No variety in the rates of emotional valence or remember-
know judgments was accepted as indications of failure of following memory 
instructions. In total, 38 of the 178 data were dropped from analyses in order 
to increase the validity of the study. Finally 140 subjects, 112 female and 28 
male with the mean age of 20.79 ranging from 17 to 28, were included in 
the study. All subjects had normal or corrected to normal vision and were 
native speakers of Turkish.  
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2.2 Materials 
 A personal information questionnaire including the inclusion criteria 
was developed by the author in order to determine the inclusion of the 
participants in the experiment. In addition, a Turkish standardized version of 
the Symptom Assessment-45 Questionnaire (SA-45) was used to check the 
presence of any psychiatric symptoms (see Appendix C). This inventory, 
helping to figure out the overall psychological distress level as well as the 
presence of particular symptoms, was developed by Maruish (2000). There 
were 45 items grouped in nine subcategories representing nine symptom 
dimensions. These dimensions were called as somatization, obsession-
compulsion, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic 
anxiety, paranoid ideation and psychoticism. Items were responded on a 5-
point-Likert scale from 0 to 4. The original form of SA-45 consisted of 90 
items (SCL-R-90), the 53-item-version of this scale was later developed by 
removing the items whose factor loading was low Maruish (2000). 
Standardization of SA-45 for Turkish sample is being made by Epözdemir 
(2008). 
 The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI) (Oldfield, 1971) was 
used to measure participants’ strength of handedness. This inventory 
consisted of 10 items. Test takers first indicated their preferred hand for the 
each particular activity, and then they were required to report the strength of 
their preference. This scale was translated into Turkish by the author (see 
Appendix D). Back translation was made.   
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Seventy-two pictures depicting the themes about well-known 
disasters all around the world were selected by the author as anxiety-
inducing stimuli (see Appendices E, F, and G). These photos depicted 
earthquakes, fires, terrorist attacks, wars, hurricanes, nuclear and car 
accidents, violence, and famine that generally occurred within the last ten 
years. Emotional valence of each picture was rated by 15 clinical 
psychologists on a 5-point-Likert scale in a group session.  
Twelve of the 72 was used in order to eliminate primacy and recency 
effects. The rest of the sixty pictures were divided into two groups, one of 
which was used in the phase of anxiety induction, and the other group was 
used in the memory tasks as distracters in the explicit memory task and 
controls in the implicit memory task. The pictures in two groups matched in 
content/theme, complexity and the amount of anxiety they induce. In order 
to assess the amount of anxiety each group of pictures provokes, a pilot 
study was conducted (for details see the Procedure). Turkish version of the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Öner, 1977) (only the part for state 
anxiety) was administered to measure anxiety level (see Appendix H). The 
original of this scale was developed by Spielberger, Gorusch, and Lushene 
(1970). The scale consisted of two separate parts. There were 20 items in 
each section, one measuring temporary and situational anxiety level (“state 
anxiety”) and the other measuring general and permanent anxiety level 
(“trait anxiety).  
All pictures were presented via a computer in full screen mode. At 
the end of the session, a slideshow composed of 25 pictures of natural 
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landscape was displayed to eradicate the effect of mood manipulation 
procedure. Participants listened to Carabina 30-30, a traditional Mexican 
song, while watching the slideshow.  
 
2.3 Procedure  
2.3.1 Pilot Study  
 
A pilot study was conducted for manipulation check. Thirty-six 
students at Bilgi University were accidentally assigned to one of the two 
conditions: (1) In the first condition participants were presented with the 
first group of pictures that were thought to be used for anxiety induction in 
the experimental phase of the study (30 pictures, which have pairs in the 
second group of pictures, plus 12 pictures, which were prepared against 
primacy and recency effect -6 of them were placed at the beginning and the 
remaining 6 were placed at the end of the 30 to-be-studied pictures); (2) In 
the second condition participants viewed the second group of pictures that 
are thought not to be presented in mood manipulation procedure but to be 
included in memory test in the experimental phase of the study (the rest 30 
pictures plus the same 12 pictures used to eliminate primacy and recency 
effects). The two groups of pictures were hypothesized not to differ in their 
anxiety eliciting features.  
Participants in all groups were, first, informed about the subject and 
the procedure of the pilot study and then they completed the anxiety scale. 
In the mood manipulation procedure, they viewed each picture for 5 sec. 
There was no interval between the pictures and thus the total duration of the 
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slideshow was 3.5 min. After the slideshow, they were given the anxiety 
scale for the second time.  
At the end of the session, participants were presented with a 
slideshow of landscapes accompanied by a relaxing song, and debriefed.  
 
2.3.2 Main Study 
Participants were tested in individual sessions. After completing an 
informed consent form in accordance with approved Turkish Psychological 
Association (TPD) ethical guidelines (see Appendix A), they were provided 
with the BSI.  
 After completing the scale participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the four conditions: 1) Suppression condition followed by explicit 
memory task, 2) suppression condition followed by implicit memory task, 
3) nonsuppression condition followed by explicit memory task, and 4) 
nonsuppression condition followed by implicit memory task.  
In the sessions involving suppression, participants were presented 
with the anxiety evoking slideshow and asked to watch and understand the 
content of each photo. The slideshow consisted of 42 pictures (i.e. the first 
group of photos) with 5 sec view period for each. The complete duration of 
slideshow was 3.5 minutes. 
Subjects were then provided with 3.5 min period during which they 
were asked to write their stream of consciousness. They were allowed to 
think anything during this period except the photos they have just viewed 
and related feelings to them. Moreover, they were asked to indicate 
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whenever the prohibited thoughts come to their mind. In order to encourage 
suppression of the anxiety provoking stimuli and prevent anticipation of a 
memory task, subjects were informed about a following arithmetical task 
(easy addition and subtraction problems which are not supposed to evoke 
anxiety-see Appendix I). The experimenter gave the following instructions 
which are similar to those in Wegner’s study (1993, p. 1094):  
 
 “During the next few minutes, you will simply be asked to write down 
your stream of consciousness, to indicate what is going through your mind. 
Measures have been taken to ensure your privacy and to guarantee 
confidentiality concerning your participation in this study. I don't know if 
you have done any stream of consciousness writing before, but basically 
this is free writing. It doesn't have to be grammatically correct; it can be 
words, phrases, or complete sentences. Just write down what you are 
thinking. Your report might include, but is not limited to, descriptions of 
images, ideas, memories, feelings, fantasies, plans, sensations, 
observations, daydreams, objects that catch your attention, and efforts to 
solve a problem. There are no restrictions, qualifications, conventions, or 
expectations. [However, there is only one exception: I want you not to 
think about the photos you have just viewed and any related feelings to 
them. If any such thought comes to your mind put a check mark in the 
margin of the paper for each time. After that, you will be asked a few of 
questions on basic arithmetical operations.] You may begin.” 
 
Following the suppression period subjects went through a 3.5 min-
distracter period when they completed the personal information 
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questionnaire and the Turkish translated version of the EHI, and performed 
some mathematical problems. In order to enhance the effectiveness of 
distracter period the duration of the distracter period was extended to 11.5 
min after the 58th participants of the study.  
After the distracter period, participants were presented with either 
unexpected implicit or explicit memory tests. The explicit memory test 
included 30 new (serving as distracter) and 30 old pictures. All pictures 
were presented via a computer in a random order and subjects were required 
to recognize the pictures they have previously seen. After the 34th participant 
of explicit memory groups, recognition task was accompanied by a 
subsequent remember-know judgment. For each photo that they indicated as 
they saw before, they were to make a subsequent remember-know-guess 
decision. Before the experimental phase participants were informed about 
the definition of “remember”, “know” and “guess” responses, and the 
difference among them according Eldridge, Sarfatti, and Knowlton (2002) 
(see Appendix J). After the instructions, subjects performed 5 training trials.  
In the implicit memory task, subjects were required to study the 
same 60 pictures in the same order as in the explicit memory task. In this 
time, subjects’ task was to rate the emotional valence of each picture on a 
Likert scale from 1 to 5 (1= neutral and 4= extremely negative) by pressing 
an appropriate key. Subject were told to put their left middle finger above 
the key 1, left index finger above the key 2, right index finger above the key 
3, and right middle finger above the key 4. After pressing the key, the next 
photo appeared on the screen. The time from the appearance of each photo 
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to the subject’s indication of his judgment (i.e. response time to each photo) 
was recorded.  
 In the nonsuppression conditions, subjects completed the same steps 
as in the suppression conditions, except that they did not receive 
suppression instruction. Instead, they were allowed to think anything when 
they are reporting their stream of consciousness for 3.5 min following the 
presentation of the slideshow. The instruction in this condition was like the 
following (Wegner, 1993, p. 1094):   
 
“During the next few minutes, you will simply be asked to write down your 
stream of consciousness, to indicate what is going through your mind. 
Measures have been taken to ensure your privacy and to guarantee 
confidentiality concerning your participation in this study. I don't know if 
you have done any stream of consciousness writing before, but basically 
this is free writing. It doesn't have to be grammatically correct; it can be 
words, phrases, or complete sentences. Just write down what you are 
thinking. Your report might include, but is not limited to, descriptions of 
images, ideas, memories, feelings, fantasies, plans, sensations, 
observations, daydreams, objects that catch your attention, and efforts to 
solve a problem. There are no restrictions, qualifications, conventions, or 
expectations. [After that, you will be asked a few of questions on basic 
arithmetical operations.] You may begin.” 
 
At the end of the session, participants in the suppression groups 
(suppression followed by explicit task, and suppression followed by implicit 
task) were asked to rate how much they have tried to suppress their thoughts 
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and how much they succeed suppression on a Likert scale from 0 to 100, 
separately (see Appendix K). Additionally, any strategies for not thinking 
about thoughts related to the photos during the suppression period were 
assessed.  
Following the completion of the experiment, participants watched 
the slideshow of landscape pictures accompanied by a relaxing song, and 
debriefed.    
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Chapter 3: Results 
 
 
3.1 Pilot Study 
 In order to check the effectiveness of the study photos in making 
individuals anxious a 2 x 2 mixed model ANOVA was applied to 
participants’ scores on the State Anxiety Inventory. The group of photos (to-
be-suppressed photos vs. distracter/control photos presented during the 
memory task) served as between-subjects factor, and the session at which 
the anxiety score was obtained (before vs. after slideshow) served as within-
subjects factor. There was a significant difference in anxiety scores from 
first session to second session, F(1,34)= 70.932, p<.001, partial ή2=.676, 
observed power=1.000. After participants watched the slide of the photos, 
they became more anxious (before anxiety induction, M= 40.31, SD= 
11.553; after anxiety induction M= 54.97, SD= 10.421). Moreover, as 
expected, the first and the second groups of photos were equally effective in 
inducing anxiety, F(1,34)= .072, p=.790, partial ή2=.002. Similarly, 
psychologists found the second group of photos (M= 43.50, SD=8.080) as 
negative as the first group of photos (M= 43.53, SD= 6.107), t(29)= -.024, 
p=.981.  
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3.2 Main Study 
 3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 Based on the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the 
distributions of scores, all data in the form of measurements, except the 
degree of handedness, and the accuracy of guess responses, had normal 
distributions.  
 Changing the duration of distracter period from 3 minutes to 12 
minutes did not moderate the effect of suppression on recognition or 
implicit memory performance (for recognition task, p=.314 when only the 
cases taking 12 min. distracter period were included, and p=.266 when all 
cases were included; for implicit task, p=.403 and p=.341 respectively). 
Accordingly, all cases were entered into the data analyses.  
   
 3.2.2 Suppression and Memory  
3.2.2.1 Explicit Memory 
 Mean (and standard deviation) for accuracy of recognition was 23.57 
(3.602), raw scores of remember responses was 16.92 (7.149), raw scores of 
know responses was 8.21 (6.261), raw scores of guess responses was 2.13 
(1.932), accurate scores of remember responses was 16.47 (7.086), accuracy 
scores of know responses was 7.32 (6.290), and accuracy of guess responses 
was .58 (1.622). 
Recognition  
For analysis of the relationship between suppression and explicit 
memory initial analysis was conducted on recognition performance. The 
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accuracy of recognition responses was estimated by subtracting the total 
number of incorrect responses to new photos (false alarms) from the total 
number of correct responses to old photos (hits) in order to eliminate the 
possibility of response bias (tendency to respond indiscriminately to all 
items). Accuracy of recognition was high for the sample overall (M=23.57, 
SD=3.602). Independent samples of t-tests yielded no difference between 
suppression and nonsuppression groups in the accuracy of recognition 
scores, t(73)= .561, p= .288 (M=23.281, SD=3.81, and M=23.34, SD=3.42, 
respectively).  
Engaging in suppression per se may not produce adverse effects on 
memory, rather how much individuals put effort for suppression and/or how 
much they succeed to suppress may lead to impairments in memory 
processes. In the second step of each analysis for the memory performances, 
this view was tested.  
Suppression success and suppression effort was assessed via a scale 
ranging from 0 to 100. For statistical advantage, those data were reduced 
into two categories separately. The median score of each variable was used 
as the cutoff point. Scores from lowest to 50 were classified as “low 
success” or “low effort”, and those from 51 to 100 were classified as “high 
success” or “high effort”.  
The effect of suppression success on the accuracy of recognition 
responses was calculated via the Mann-Whitney test. The results indicated 
that individuals who were more successful in suppressing the thoughts about 
the anxiety related photos obtained similar accuracy scores to those who 
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were less successful, z= .977, p= .164. Likewise, there was no significant 
difference in accuracy rates between individuals with high and low 
suppression effort, z= .888, p=.188. On the other hand, as Figure 1 shows, 
individuals who succeeded to suppress by using high effort showed 
marginally poorer recognition performance than those who were not 
successful even though they tried hard, z= 1,583, p=.056.  Furthermore, 
when people did not display much effort to suppress, their recognition 
performance was not affected by their suppression success level, z= .397, 
p=.34.  
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Figure 1.   Means of accuracy scores as a function of the levels of 
suppression effort and suppression success. 
 
 In order to assess rehearsal effect on recognition performance a 
Pearson correlation test was conducted. The results indicated a significantly 
positive correlation between the number of intrusions and the accuracy rate, 
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r=.317, p<.05. As the number of intrusions for to-be-suppressed thoughts 
increased, so does the number of correctly recognized items.   
Remember-Know-Guess Judgments  
For exploring the effect of the suppression instruction on remember-
know-guess responses, means (and standard deviations) are depicted in 
Table 1.  
 
Table 1.  Means (standard deviations) for number of remember, know and 
guess responses as a function of test measure and suppression 
instruction 
 
 
Test type and measure 
Suppression 
(n=27) 
Nonsuppression 
(n=26) 
Remember 
17.33 
(7.47) 
16.5 
(6.92) 
Know 
7.78 
(5.56) 
8.65 
(6.99) 
 
Raw number of 
responses 
Guess 
1.59 
(1,6) 
2.69 
(2,11) 
Remember 
16.59 
(7.3) 
16.35 
(7.0) 
Know 
6.70 
(5.54) 
7.96 
(7.04) 
 
 
Corrected scores 
Guess 
.85 
(1.35) 
.31 
(1.85) 
 
In order to examine the relationship between suppression condition 
and the absolute number of remember, know and guess responses a 2 
(suppression vs. nonsuppression) X 3 (response type) mixed model 
ANOVA with response type as the within-subjects factor, and group as the 
between-subjects factor was conducted. In the previous analyses 
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participants’ total score on SA-45 was included in all analyses on explicit 
memory performances as covariate. However, the effect of the covariate 
factor was not significant, thus SA-45 scores was not included in final 
analyses as covariate. Results revealed a main effect of response type, 
F(2,102)=63.939, p=<.001, partial ή2= .556, observed power=1.00. 
According to post hoc analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment, participants 
were more likely to give ‘remember’ response (M=16.92, SD=7.149) than 
‘know’ M=8.21, SD= 6.261) and ‘guess’ (M=2.13, SD=1.932) responses, 
and they were more likely to give ‘know’ response than ‘guess’ response 
regardless of receiving suppression instruction or accuracy of their 
responses. Neither main effect of suppression instruction, F(1,51)=1.512, p= 
.22, partial ή2= .029, nor interaction between response type and suppression 
was observed, F(2,102)=.324, p= .724, partial ή2= .006.  
For exploring the effects of suppression success and suppression 
effort on the absolute number of remember-know-guess responses the 
Mann-Whitney tests were applied. Due to the statistical restrictions of the 
nonparametric tests the difference of remember responses from total number 
of know and guess responses was included in data analyses 
(recollection/familiarity =R – [G+K]). This decision was based on the 
knowledge that ‘guess’ responses, like ‘know’ responses, depends on 
familiarity process. Thus, these two kinds of judgment are not essentially 
different (Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1999).  
The results revealed that neither suppression effort nor suppression 
success induced any impacts on the amount of difference between 
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‘remember’ and ‘know+guess’ responses (z= .782, p=.217; and z= .923, 
p=.128, respectively). While combination effects of suppression success and 
suppression effort did not generate a significant difference (with high 
suppression effort the effect of suppression success: z= 1.392, p=.082; with 
low suppression effort: z= .327, p=.372), the lowest raw remember rate was 
observed when both suppression effort and suppression success were high. 
That is, participants tended to give ‘know’ or ‘guess’ responses (M=14.33, 
SD=8.185) slightly more frequently than ‘remember’ responses (M=12, 
SD=12) when they showed high suppression effort and high suppression 
success. Under all the other conditions (low effort-high success; high effort-
low success; and low effort-low success) individuals were more likely to 
judge as remember than as ‘know+guess’. The results of the Mann-Whitney 
tests are summarized in Table 2 and Figure 2. 
 
Table 2.  Means (standard deviations) for absolute number of remember 
and know+guess responses as a function of test measure and 
suppression instruction. 
 
  High Effort Low Effort 
Response Type Low Success High Success Low Success High Success 
Remember 
19.56  
(6.784) 
12       
 (12) 
15.5  
(5.655)                 
17.64  
(7.646) 
Know+Guess 
6.11  
(4.859) 
14.00  
(8.185) 
11.25  
(3.862) 
10.09  
(5.855) 
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Figure 2.   Means for ‘remember’ and ‘know+guess’ difference in raw 
scores as a function of the levels of suppression effort and 
suppression success. 
 
The accuracy of remember-know-guess responses was separately 
calculated by subtracting  total number of ‘remember’ or ‘know’ or ‘guess’ 
false alarms from total number of ‘remember’ or ‘know’ or ‘guess’ hits. 
Analysis of corrected scores using a 2 (suppression vs. nonsuppression) X 3 
(response type) mixed model ANOVA replicated the previous finding 
presented above. There was a significant main effect of response type, 
F(2,102)=75.242, p=<.01, partial ή2= .001, observed power=1.00. Thus, 
participants significantly responded as ‘remember’. There was neither main 
effect of suppression instruction, F(1,51)=.231, p= .633, partial ή2= .005, 
nor interaction between response type and suppression condition, 
F(2,102)=.276, p= .759, partial ή2= .005.  
Further analyses for the effects of suppression effort and suppression 
success on the accuracy of ‘remember’-‘know+guess’ responses were 
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conducted via the Mann-Whitney tests. The amount of difference between 
‘remember’ and ‘know+guess’ responses was not influenced by the level of 
effort paid for suppression, z= .981, p=.163. Similarly, no suppression 
success effect was detected, z= .610, p=.271. While good suppressors and 
bad suppressors did not display an obvious difference in terms of the 
accurate ‘remember’-‘know+guess’ discrepancy under low level of 
suppression effort, under high level of suppression effort the discrepancy 
between ‘remember’ and ‘know+guess’ responses was lower for good 
suppressors as compared to poor suppressors (see Table 3 and Figure 3 for 
means). However these analyses did not reach the significance level (with 
high suppression effort the effect of suppression success: z= .653, p=.257; 
and that with low suppression effort: z= .655, p=.256) 
 
Table 3.  Means (standard deviations) for accuracy scores of remember and 
know+guess responses as a function of test measure and 
suppression instruction. 
 
 
  High Effort Low Effort 
Response Type Low Success High Success Low Success High Success 
Remember 
18.89 
(7.373) 
12.00 
(12) 
15.5 
(4.655) 
16.36 
(6.932) 
Know+Guess 
5.66 
(4.242) 
7,33 
(11) 
10.75 
(4.878) 
8.00 
(5.366) 
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Figure 3.   Means of remember-know+guess accuracy scores as a function 
of the levels of suppression effort and suppression success. 
 
3.2.2.2 Implicit Memory 
 Implicit memory performance was considered as the difference in 
response times for assigning an emotional valence to old and new photos. 
As expected for an indication of implicit memory, the response times to new 
photos (M= 1903.23, SD=670.75) were significantly slower than those to 
old photos (M=2143.49, SD=776.628) according to the results of the paired-
samples t-tests, t(64)= -8.078, p<.000. Thus, the implicit memory task was 
successful.  
In order to test the effect of suppression on implicit memory 
performance first an independent samples t-test was applied. In the 
suppression condition the difference between response times to old and new 
pictures was slightly more obvious than that in the nonsuppression condition 
(M=270.14 ms, SD= 240.066, and M=213.02 ms, SD=239.776, 
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respectively). However, such difference was not statistically significant, 
t(63)=.959, p=.17 (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4.   Means of differences in response times to old and new pictures 
under suppression and nonsuppression conditions.. 
 
Second, a 2X2 mixed model ANOVA with response time to new and 
old photos as the within-subjects factor, and presence of the suppression 
instruction as the between-subjects factors was conducted. A main effect of 
response time to new and old photos was identified, F(1,63)= 65.756, 
p<001, partial ή2=.511. Presence of the suppression instruction did not 
induce a main effect, F(1,63)= 1.591, p=212, partial ή2=.025. No interaction 
was found, F(1,63)= .919, p=.314, partial ή2=.014.   
For the further analysis measuring the effect of suppression effort 
and suppression success on implicit memory performance (the difference 
between response times to old and new pictures) four separate the Mann-
Whitney tests were conducted. Neither suppression effort nor suppression 
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success yielded any effects on implicit memory performance; z= .499, 
p=.31, and z= 1.253, p=.11, respectively. Moreover, when individuals 
engaged in suppression with high effort, they displayed similar implicit 
memory performance regardless of how much they succeeded to suppress, 
z= .092, p=.463. Nevertheless, good suppressors demonstrated significantly 
lower performance on implicit memory than poor suppressors when they did 
not try hard to suppress, z= 1,709, p<.05. The results of Mann-Whitney tests 
are depicted in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.   Means of differences in response times to old and new pictures 
as a function of suppression effort and suppression success. 
 
 
3.2.3 Suppression, Handedness and Memory  
 The handedness scores of the participants were ranged from 0 to 
100. The mean score for the sample on the EHI was 76.86 (25.44) and 
median was 80. In order to identify participants as either mixed or strongly 
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right-handed median was used as the cutoff point. Scores from lowest to 80 
were classified as mixed-handed, and those from 81 to 100 were classified 
as strongly right-handed. 
 
  3.2.3.1 Explicit Memory 
Recognition  
Means and standard deviations for accuracy scores in relation to the 
presence of suppression instruction and the degree of handedness are 
presented in Table 4. A two-way ANOVA was performed on accuracy 
scores, where suppression condition (suppress vs. no suppress) and 
handedness (mixed vs. strong) were used as independent variables. Analyses 
demonstrated that the accuracy of recognition did not change as a function 
of suppression condition, F(1,71)=.324, p= .571, partial ή2= .005, or the 
degree of handedness, F(1,71)=.131, p= .719, partial ή2= .002. There was no 
evidence of a significant two-factor interaction, F(1,71)=.003 p=.959, partial 
ή2= .000.  
 
Table 4.  Means (standard deviations) for accuracy scores as a function of 
 handedness and suppression condition. 
 
Suppression  Nonsuppression  
Mixed-handed 
(n=20) 
Strong-handed 
(n=17) 
Mixed-handed 
(n=19) 
Strong-handed 
(n=19) 
23.65  
(3.746) 
24.00  
(4.000) 
23.21  
(3.706) 
23.47  
(3.204) 
 
Further analyses were conducted on suppression success and 
suppression effort. No significant interaction was found between 
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suppression effort and strength of handedness for accuracy scores, 
F(1,33)=.015, p=.904, partial ή2= .000. On the other hand, according to the 
results of the Mann-Whitney tests while successful suppression did not 
generate a significant difference in accuracy rates for strongly right-handed 
individuals, z= .467, p=.32, mixed handed participants displayed a 
significantly lower performance when they successfully suppressed 
unwanted thoughts about the photos z= 2.064, p<.05. In other words, mixed- 
handed participants recognized more accurately than strongly right-handed 
participants when they did not suppress successfully, z=1.945, p<.05; but 
under the condition of high suppression success strongly right handed 
people were slightly better than those with mixed handedness (z= .639, p= 
.261). This finding is depicted in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6.   Means for accuracy scores as a function of strength of 
handedness and level of suppression success. 
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Remember-Know-Guess Judgments  
 Means and standard deviations for accuracy scores of remember-
know-guess judgments as a function of handedness and suppression 
condition are presented in Table 5. 
 A 2 x 2x 3 repeated measures ANOVA was applied in order to test 
the combined effect of handedness and the suppression instruction. In this 
analysis, response type (remember-know-guess) served as within-subjects 
factor, and suppression condition (suppression vs. nonsuppression) and 
strength of handedness (mixed vs. strong) served as between-subjects 
factors. Mixed-handed and strongly right-handed participants did not differ 
in the accuracy of remember-know-guess judgments, F(2,98)=.006, p=.994, 
partial ή2= .000. Moreover, no interaction between suppression condition 
and strength of handedness for the accuracy of remember-know-guess 
responses was observed, F(2,98)=1.667, p=.194, partial ή2= .033. 
Nevertheless, the memory strength of mixed-handed individuals was more 
likely to be negatively affected by the suppression instruction than that of 
strongly right-handed individuals. That is, a slight, but not significant, 
decrease in the number of ‘remember’ responses and a slight increase in 
‘know’ and ‘guess’ responses was observed when mixed handed 
participants were given suppression instruction as compared to those who 
were not. For strongly right-handed individual a reverse condition was 
observed.  
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Table 5.  Means (standard deviations) for accuracy of remember, know and 
guess responses as a function of strength of handedness and 
suppression condition. 
 
Response type   
  
Strength of 
handedness Remember Know Guess 
Suppression 
 (n=14) 
15.71  
(7.087) 
8.00 
(5.831) 
.64  
(1.499)  
Mixed-handed  
 
Nonsuppression 
(n=14) 
17.43  
(6.618) 
6.79 
(6.589) 
.50  
(2.279) 
Suppression 
 (n=13) 
17.54  
(7.688) 
5.31 
(5.056) 
1.08 
(1.188) Strongly right-
handed Nonsuppression 
(n=12) 
15.08  
(7.513) 
9.33 
(7.584) 
.08  
(1.240) 
  
 
 Likewise, there was no interaction either between suppression effort 
and handedness or suppression success and handedness. Mixed-handed 
participants did not show a significantly different performance from 
strongly right handed participants on the basis of suppression success or 
suppression effort. Under the condition of low suppression success the 
Mann-Whitney tests on handedness and remember-know difference yielded 
z= .153, p=.438, and analysis with high suppression success condition 
revealed z= .427, p=.334.  For analysis conducted when suppression effort 
was low, the result was z= .353, p=.361; and when suppression effort was 
high, z= .164, p=.435 was obtained.  
  
3.2.3.2 Implicit Memory 
 Means and standard deviations for response time (in milliseconds) 
for rating emotional valence of new and old photos as a function of strength 
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of handedness and suppression condition are presented in Table 6. A two-
way MANOVA was conducted in order to measure the impact of 
suppression on implicit memory performance of mixed handed individuals 
as compared to strongly right handed individuals.  In this analysis, response 
time to new and old photos in rating emotional valence served as within-
subjects factor, and strength of handedness and suppression condition 
served as between-subjects factors. There was no effect of the strength of 
handedness on implicit memory performance, F(1,61)= .616, p= .435, 
partial ή2=.01. Both mixed handed and strongly right handed participants 
responded more slowly to new photos compared to old photos. Similarly, 
when suppression condition was included in this analysis, no interaction was 
obtained, F(1,61)= .586, p= .447, partial ή2=.01. That is, mixed-handed 
individuals were as fast as strongly right-handed individuals in responding 
to old and new photos under both suppression and nonsuppression 
condition. However, suppression instruction had a slightly greater impact on 
implicit memory performance for mixed handed individuals than strongly 
right handed individuals. When mixed handed participants received the 
suppression instruction, their implicit memory performance was slightly, but 
not significantly enhanced.  
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Table 6.  Means (standard deviations) for response time (in milliseconds) 
for rating emotional valance of new and old photos as a function 
of strength of handedness and suppression condition. 
 
Handedness 
Suppression 
condition 
RT old photos 
(ms) 
RT new photos 
(ms) 
Suppression 
(n=15) 
1798,31 
(606,775) 
2117,48 
(742,978) 
Mixed-handed 
Nonsuppression 
(n=13) 
1964,44 
(858,319) 
2178,20 
(909,521) 
Suppression 
(n=16) 
1746,49 
(361,931) 
1970,99 
(490,967) Strongly right-
handed Nonsuppression 
(n=21) 
2059,71 
(765,279) 
2272,26 
(907,761) 
 
Further analysis measuring the effect of suppression effort and 
suppression success in relation to the strength of handedness on implicit 
memory performance (the difference between response times to old and new 
pictures) was conducted via the Mann-Whitney tests. The difference in 
response times to new and old photos did not vary significantly between 
mixed-handedness and strong-handedness either when suppression success 
was low or when it was high, z= 1.601, p=.055 (comparison of mixed and 
strong handedness under low suppression success),  and z= .853, p=.426 
(comparison of mixed and strong handedness under high suppression 
success). Likewise, no effect of suppression effort in relation to handedness 
was observed, z= .333, p=.369 (comparison of mixed and strong handedness 
under low suppression effort), and z= 1.416, p=.078 (comparison of mixed 
and strong handedness under high suppression effort). 
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 3.2.4 Moderating Factors for Negativity Perception  
 Participants who received the suppression instruction found to-be-
suppressed photos slightly less negative (M=89.71, SD=14.985) than those 
who were allowed to think about these anxiety-related photos during the 
free writing period (M=95.15, SD=14.196). However, an independent 
samples t-test indicated no group difference in emotional valence ratings, 
t(63)=1.505, p=.069.  
 For analyzing the effects of suppression success and suppression 
effort, Figure 7 reveals a tendency to rate old pictures as more negative 
when participants successfully suppressed the thoughts about these photos 
as compared to when they did not. The increase in the emotional valence of 
the old photos was even more obvious when high successful suppression 
was accompanied by high suppression effort. On the other the results of the 
Mann-Whitney tests indicated neither the effect of suppression success on 
the rates of emotional valence of old photos, z= .528, p=.299; nor the effect 
of suppression effort, z= .666, p=.252.  
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Figure 7.   Means for the total emotional valence ratio to old and new 
pictures as a function of the levels of suppression effort and 
suppression success. 
 
 
 For analysis of the effect of degree of handedness an independent 
samples t-tests was performed on the total rate of emotional valence for 
each subject. The results indicated a group difference in perceived 
negativity level of pictures, t(63)= 2.128, p<.05. Mixed-handed subjects 
found the experimental pictures (old and new) less negative (M=179.46, 
SD=34.584) than strongly right-handed subjects (M=194.68, SD=22.969) 
(see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8.   Means for the total rate of emotional valence for pictures as a 
function of degree of handedness. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
 
 
In everyday life, we face many stressful situations, from mild to 
severe, and we somehow maintain our life with the help of the strategies 
that we insert to regulate our negative emotions. Some of these strategies 
operate out of awareness, and some of them are the result of our conscious 
attempt. Although emotion regulation strategies protect us from being 
overwhelmed by emotions provoked by the adverse stimuli, they may have 
some costs in the long-run. Thought suppression, a conscious attempt to 
refuse to think about or pay attention to the target aversive stimuli, is one of 
the common ways of coping with unbearable feelings. The present study 
was conducted to examine the effect of suppression of visual emotional 
stimuli on different types of memory systems. Additionally, it was aimed to 
explore a potential relation of thought suppression to decreased hemispheric 
integration. Finally, moderating factors, such as degree of handedness and 
suppression, in perceiving distress were investigated.  
Along with the first aim of the study, a detrimental effect of thought 
suppression on explicit memory performance, but not on implicit memory 
performance was hypothesized. More specifically, the first hypothesis of the 
study was that subjects who received the suppression instruction would 
recognize to-be suppressed photos less accurately than those who were 
allowed think anything. However, this was not the case. The recognition 
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responses of suppression group and nonsuppression group were equally 
accurate. This may be because the emotional stimuli were so demanding 
that subjects might have had difficulties to suppress appropriately 
(Rachman, 1981; Depue, et al., 2006). This is compatible with Wegner’s 
(1987; 1992) theory of double processes in suppression. Operator process 
may have been impeded due to the demanding nature of the target, but intact 
monitoring process may have provided opportunity for rehearsal. However, 
one can be more confident with this conclusion if the results indicated a 
superior performance after suppression. On the other hand it can be 
concluded that no difference in recognition performance after suppression 
may have resulted from the variation in subjects’ ability to suppress.  
In order to take into account potential suppression failure, secondary 
analyses were conducted on the level of effort individuals put for 
suppression and the level of their success of suppression. According to the 
results, suppression of emotional stimuli led to impairment in recognition 
memory only when the individual tried hard to suppress the aversive target 
and additionally when s/he came up with success. Although this finding had 
a marginal statistical significance, it has important implications for the 
underlying process of thought suppression. This finding suggests that the 
investment of cognitive resources for successful avoidance from unwanted 
thoughts leads to the disruption of rehearsal opportunity.  Along with the 
finding indicating a positive correlation between the number of intrusion 
and recognition performance, the lack of rehearsal resulting from depleted 
cognitive resources is suggested as underlying the detrimental effect of 
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thought suppression. Therefore, these findings provide support for resource 
depletion explanation (Wegner et al., 1992; Klein & Bratton, 2007).   
The second hypothesis of the study was related to examining the 
effect of thought suppression on retrieval of details associated with the 
visual information. It was expected that being involved in thought 
suppression would disrupt recollection based recognition process more than 
familiarity based one. The study failed to indicate a mere effect of 
suppression on different processes of visual recognition memory. Likewise, 
analysis of suppression effort and suppression success revealed no 
significant results. However, it is important to note that when high 
suppression effort interacted with suppression success participants’ 
recollection performance slightly decreased. However, there was no 
considerable statistical significance.  
This failure in providing evidence for recollection disruption is not 
consistent with the findings of Wegner’s (1996) study that found a 
disruption in the recall of the sequence of the visual stimulus. Although 
different forms of memory were subjected to suppression effect, the 
explanation for expected detrimental effect depended on the resource 
depletion theory. Similar to serial recall, retrieval of associated details 
requires a deep, cognitively expensive process (Yonelinas, 2002). However, 
these two memory systems may rely on different mechanism (Yonelinas, 
2002). For instance recollection mainly involves a holistic, simultaneous 
process, whereas sequential processes depend on the analysis of small 
components of the target material.  
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 The third hypothesis of the study related to its first aim suggested 
that there would not be impairment in implicit memory performance 
following suppression. The result was in the line with this expectation. 
Suppression group tended to display a slight enhancement in implicit 
memory performance relative to nonsuppression group. Furthermore, while 
recognition memory of good suppressors suffers more than those of poor 
suppressors under effortful suppression, implicit performance of good 
suppressors was worse than poor suppressors under low suppression effort. 
Therefore, the decrease in implicit memory performance occurred only 
when individuals easily managed to avoid the target thoughts. As a stimulus 
is more personally relevant it is harder to be avoided (Klein & Bratton, 
2007). Thus, it can be suggested that demanding targets such as, personally 
relevant materials, even when they suppressed successfully, are more 
resistant to extinguish from implicit mechanisms. However, with high effort 
and successful suppression their conscious representations abate.  
 The second aim of the study was to provide information about 
potential neurological mechanisms underling thought suppression. Firstly, it 
was hypothesized that mixed handedness, which is thought to be an 
indication of hemispheric integration, would be associated with a greater 
decrease in recognition performance after suppression than strong 
handedness. As indicated above, suppression per se was not again capable 
of inducing any effect on memory systems. The effects of suppression effort 
and suppression success on the accuracy of recognition responses were 
examined by independent analyses. Mixed-handed and strongly right-
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handed individuals displayed similar recognition performance regardless of 
how much effort they expended. On the other hand, while in the absence of 
a successful suppression mixed-handed participants recognized more 
accurately than strongly-right handed participants. This finding is similar to 
those of Parker et al. (2008) but not to those of Propper and Christman 
(2004). Although the measure of hemispheric integration use in this study 
was the same as that used in Propper and Christman’s (2008) study, rather 
than Parker’s (bilateral eye movements procedure),  the results indicated a 
reverse pattern. This is probably because the variation in suppression group 
in terms of suppression success. Inclusion of only participants who 
successfully suppressed may reveal different conclusions. On the other 
hand, imposition of bilateral eye movements may be more influential for the 
retrieval of verbal stimuli. Being mixed handed may be as effective as 
engaging in bilateral eye movements in recognition of visual stimuli. In 
addition to the demonstrations of those studies, this study provided evidence 
for an improved memory performance associated with mixed handedness 
for emotional information. Moreover, the recognition performance of 
mixed-handed participants was influenced by successful suppression to a 
greater extent than that of strongly-right handed participants. As noted in the 
introduction, episodic memory involves the functions of two hemispheres. It 
can therefore be argued that successful thought suppression may produce 
explicit memory deficit through preventing “the interaction of right 
hemisphere retrieval process with memory traces encoded in the left 
hemisphere” (Parker et al., 2008, p. 136).   
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 Second hypothesis deriving from the second purpose of the study 
indicated a considerable decrease in recollection-based recognition 
responses as compared to those of familiarity-based in mixed-handedness 
after suppression. On the other hand, strongly-right handed individuals were 
expected to be less affected by suppression instruction in terms of 
recollection and familiarity performances. Along with the previous findings 
of this study, receiving suppression instruction did not induce any 
differential impacts on different types of recognition memory. It can only be 
noted that a slight decrease in recollection that was accompanied by a slight 
increase in familiarity was observed in suppression group, and a reverse 
phenomenon was observed in suppression condition. Unexpectedly, analysis 
of suppression effort and suppression success did not yield any differences 
between familiarity and recollection performances as a function of the 
degree of handedness. Nonetheless, the present study also failed to find out 
well developed memory skills (i.e. retrieving much more associated details) 
related to mixed handedness in contrast to previous studies (Parker et al. 
2008; Proper & Christmant, 2004). Moreover, recall performance is more 
susceptible to either impairment or enhancement manipulations (e.g. Bjork, 
& Bjork, 2003). Because recollection is similar to recall process, this 
finding also contradicts with the previous result of the present study that 
mixed-handedness was associated with better recognition performance when 
suppression attempt failed. Therefore, it can be concluded that this study 
may have failed to allow participants to make valid remember-know 
judgment. The reasons for such failure will be discussed later.  
 84 
 The third expectation associated with the second goal of the study 
was that suppression would not influence implicit memory performance of 
either mixed-handed participants or strongly right-handed participants. As 
expected, mixed-handed and strongly right-handed participants displayed 
similar performance, even under suppression condition. However, because 
an expected effect of mere the suppression instruction was not demonstrated 
in previous findings of the study, this result does not have important 
implications. An interesting picture which is worth to be mentioned is that 
the most enhanced implicit memory performance was detected when mixed-
handed individuals received the suppression instruction. This is interesting 
because for mixed-handed people thought suppression (more accurately 
successful thought suppression) was associated with a significant 
impairment in explicit memory, but with a relative enhancement in implicit 
memory. However analyses regarding suppression effort and suppression 
success reveal more reliable indications. Once again, invulnerability of 
implicit memory across all conditions was proved. Equal implicit memory 
performances were obtained by mixed and strongly right handed 
participants even though they exhibit different amount of effort to suppress. 
Similarly, regardless of the amount of their success in suppression, both 
group attained similar implicit scores.  
  The final aim of the study was to examine the emotional experiences 
in the face of the aversive stimuli as a function of thought suppression and 
degree of handedness. It was suggested that thought suppression may 
moderate the immediate emotional responses, but would be ineffective in 
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long-term regulation of emotional experiences. Long-term consequences of 
thought suppression are beyond the scope of this study. For more immediate 
consequences of thought suppression in terms of regulating emotional 
experiences, findings reveal that regardless of the presence of suppression 
instruction or the amount of suppression effort or suppression success all 
participants found the target stimuli highly distressing. Individuals who 
engaged in suppression attempt reported slightly lower negative 
connotations for the targets. As demonstrated by previous studies on ironic 
process of suppression (e.g. Harvey, & Bryant, 1998), it can therefore be 
claimed that thought suppression is not an efficient way of regulating the 
way we perceive the external world.  
 An expected association between mixed handedness and lower level 
of distress was evidenced by the results of the study. As pointed out in the 
Introduction, more complicated mental functions involve collaboration of 
different structures of the brain (e.g. Gallagher, & Frith, (2003). Emotion 
regulation, especially more developed strategies, has been suggested to be 
related to integrative activities in the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala 
(cortical and subcortical integration) (Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Depending 
on the findings of the present study, it can also be suggested that emotion 
regulation may involve bilateral activation in the brain. This proposal should 
be investigated by future studies which include neuroimagining techniques, 
experimental manipulations or split-brain patients.  
 The result of the current study contributes to understanding the 
underlying cause of paradoxical findings of previous studies regarding 
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thought suppression and memory processes. As demonstrated in this study 
providing suppression instruction may not induce a consistent suppression 
for all study subjects. Likewise, measuring the attempt for suppression is not 
a sufficient way to check suppression manipulation. In this study both 
suppression effort and suppression success were assessed in order to ensure 
that suppression manipulation is successful. However, there were four 
different responses to the suppression instruction: 1) those who tried hard 
for suppression and managed to suppress,  2) those who tried hard but failed 
to suppress, 3) those who did not tried so much and failed to suppress, and 
4) those who did not try so much for successful suppression. Such variation 
in suppression group may account for the variations in the findings of 
different thought suppression studies. It was found that experimental 
categorization on the basis of suppression instruction was not capable of 
providing evidence for suppression effect. Rather, suppression effect on 
memory processes was detected when assigning groups on the basis of the 
level of suppression effort and suppression success. Additionally, variations 
in experimental procedures may moderate the amount of cognitive effort, 
and/or motivation for successfully suppressing (e.g. Klein & Bratton, 2007)  
 Based on the findings, it can be suggested that the effect of thought 
suppression on explicit memory processes can primarily be explained by 
inability to rehearse under a demanding cognitive load. In order to remove 
conscious trace of an unwanted thought, people should have motivation for 
avoiding from them. In real life we generally refuse to think about materials 
that provoke subjectively negative emotions. Therefore, as the personal 
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relevance of a stimulus increases, so does the motivation to forget. 
However, highly relevant information is more resistant to be diminished, 
and more likely to intrude into consciousness. Therefore, prevention of such 
intrusion demands a considerable amount of cognitive resources, which is 
also necessary to carry other ongoing cognitive tasks. First possibility is that 
engaging in such a demanding task may deplete the resources necessary for 
rehearsal. In addition, successful suppression usually involves turning 
attention to the distracter thoughts. Investment of attentional resources other 
than the target thought prevents opportunity for rehearsal. (e.g. Macrae et 
al., 1997). 
Alternatively, there might be some deficits in retrieval of suppressed 
items related to the lack of rehearsal. No decline in implicit memory 
performance of participants with high suppression effort and high 
suppression success, instead a minor increase following suppression, may 
suggest that suppressed thoughts are probably encoded properly, however 
their retrieval is impeded. This argument contradicts with the proposal of 
Fleck et al. (2001). They suggested a deficit in encoding process as a cause 
of forgetting induced by the forget instruction. The discrepancy between 
two studies may be related to methodological differences. In Fleck and his 
colleagues’ study (2001), selective encoding of to-be-remembered items 
may have inhibited the encoding of to-be forgotten items. A related decline 
in their participants’ implicit memory performance supports this view. On 
the other hand, in thought suppression paradigm there is no such encoding 
inhibitory process. 
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Another cause of retrieval deficit may be a suppression-related 
disruption of cooperation between different structures of the brain which are 
responsible for a successful retrieval of information. It has been shown that 
different memory systems, even the stages of a particular memory system 
are operated by different brain regions. Christman (ref) demonstrated an 
advantage of being mixed-handedness for episodic memory capacities. This 
is because episodic memory involves the integration between the left and 
the right hemisphere activities (Tulving et al., 1994) and mixed-handedness 
is related to increased hemispheric integration (Christman et al., 2001; 
2006). It has been observed in this study that mixed-handed participants lost 
such memory advantage after a successful suppression involvement. 
Therefore, a detrimental effect of thought suppression on hemispheric 
integration process, which results in impaired episodic memory, can be 
suggested. On the other hand, it should be considered that such conclusion 
of the study depends on indirect measure of hemispheric integration. 
Therefore, we cannot provide definite explanations about the mechanism 
through which thought suppression mediates the relationship between 
mixed-handedness and episodic memory performance. 
 Christman et al. (2003) and Parker et al. (2008) explained the nature 
of hemispheric integration underlying episodic memory performance such 
that in retrieval process neural circuits in the right prefrontal cortex connect 
with those in the left prefrontal cortex which stores memory trace for to-be-
retrieved information. They suggested that “equalized level of activation 
facilitates” this connection on the basis of the studies demonstrating an 
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“increased interhemispheric electroencephalograph (EEG) coherence in 
during the performance of tasks involving bilateral cerebral and a reduced 
one during tasks involving a single hemisphere” (Christman et al., 2003, p. 
222). Therefore, successful thought suppression may lead to an asymmetry 
in the activities of cerebral hemispheres by braking the activity of one 
hemisphere. The effect of successful thought suppression is thought to be in 
the activity of the left hemisphere. This proposal is based on the finding that 
perceptual priming effect remained intact on the face of thought suppression 
which mainly relies on the right hemisphere, 
While high suppression success followed by high effort reduced 
explicit memory performance, high suppression success obtained without 
high effort reduced implicit memory performance. When subjects found the 
stimuli more demanding, they exhibited invulnerable implicit memory 
performance to successful suppression. This finding is more compatible 
with Wegner’s dual process theory (1987; 1992). According to him, 
suppression mechanism involves one process for providing distracter in 
order to direct attention away from the target stimuli. This process 
resembles the system in resource depletion theory. The other is monitoring 
process, which controls the success of suppression, i.e. detects intrusions. 
However, monitoring process unintentionally primes the unwanted thoughts. 
Such priming effect of monitoring process may explain the resistance of 
implicit memory. 
Hypotheses depending on remember-know paradigm were not 
proved in the current study. One of the reasons for failing to demonstrate 
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disturbance in associations of suppressed information may be related to 
theoretical misassumptions about the dual process in recognition memory. 
Recently, dual-process account of recognition has been challenged. The 
result of many studies suggested a single process that underlies recognition 
(e.g. Dunn, 2008; Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1999; and 
Spitzer & Bauml, 2007). According to the single-process theory, recognition 
involves one source of information which is similar to familiarity process of 
dual-process model. Conscious recollection of associated detailed is not 
supposed to underlies recognition performance. Therefore, forget/suppress 
instructions affect the general strength of memory (Spitzer & Bauml, 2007). 
The most probable cause of the inability of indicate any difference in 
remember and know responses as a function of thought suppression and 
handedness is that variation in participants’ responses may not represent 
true variation. The first possibility is that although the same instructions 
were adopted like other studies (i.e. Eldridge et al., 2002), computer based 
structure of the current study may have been more confusing, or provoke a 
tendency to press the same keys regardless of their true judgment. 
Additionally, participants may have had difficulties to understand the 
distinction between recollection and familiarity based recognitions. It is 
important to note that the Turkish account of remember-know may produces 
a misunderstanding in some subjects. Turkish translation of “remember” 
indicates relatively less confident judgment to the translation of “know”. 
Failure of the results related to remember-know judgment probably 
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represents a problem in the validity of the subjects’ responses. On the other 
hand, recognition task was easier to perform.  
 
4.1 Implications for Psychoanalytic Ideas and Psychotherapy 
This study has importance for creating a similar process in 
psychoanalytic defense mechanism of repression, in terms of the target 
stimuli. Many previous studies have examined thought suppression with 
neutral stimuli. However, neural stimuli are not subjected to repression. 
Rather, overwhelming emotions, unbearable situations, or unaccepted 
desires create motivation for repression. However, because of high personal 
relevance, such materials are more resistant to disappear. As Freud (1915) 
proposed long ago, even thought there is no conscious access to repressed 
thoughts, their traces are observable through unconscious mechanism, such 
as dreams, tongue slips, and symptoms. Thought suppression is related to at 
least one form of repression. To-be suppressed stimuli in the present study 
were compatible with those subjected to repression. The majority of the 
participants reported fear, anxiety, worries, guilt, shame, and rage in 
response to the study photos in their free writings and during debriefing.  
Although the results of the study were not too powerful, they carry 
some implications for psychoanalytic ideas. For instance, small but 
considerable evidence was provided for repression theory that repressed 
thoughts disappear only from the conscious part of the mind and keeps its 
power on the unconscious processes. In the current study forgetting in 
explicit systems, but not in implicit systems, in response to suppression 
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attempt occurred only when participants found the target stimuli 
subjectively demanding. Likewise, only demanding thoughts that are 
unbearable undergo repression.  
Some interpretation regarding the psychoanalytic hypothesis on 
neurobiological mechanisms of repression can be made on the basis of 
present findings. It has been hypothesized that the right hemisphere is the 
place of psychodynamic unconscious and the left hemisphere is the place of 
psychodynamic conscious (Schore, 2005). Repression involves an 
impediment in connection of right hemisphere processes to verbal left 
hemisphere functions “by inhibition of neural transmission across the corpus 
callosum” (Galin, as cited in Jones, 1993, p. 71). Although, unconscious 
right hemisphere and conscious left hemisphere proposal is controversial, 
repression may involve a decreased integration (i.e. asymmetric activity 
levels) in corresponding memory regions of the left and the right 
hemispheres.  
At the first year of life, all experiences are mainly encoded in the 
structure of right hemisphere and due to the immaturity of the left 
hemisphere they lack verbal representations, thus conscious access. Primary 
repression has been identified as a result of different developmental 
timetables of the right and left hemispheres. Moreover, it has been 
suggested that the aim of the psychoanalytic psychotherapy is to help the 
patient to integrate the fragmented information relying on the two 
hemispheres of the brain through exploring past in relation to today, and 
form adaptive and comprehensive self narratives. In that sense, “integration 
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is the way in which functionally distinct components come to be clustered 
into a functional whole” (Siegle, 2001, p. 70). As Fosshage (2003) argues, 
inquiring the early experiences help to recollect patients’ implicit 
knowledge. Therefore, the patient finds opportunity to take distance from 
what is unknown to him/her, and to work through it.  
The results of the study may have some implications for the 
mechanisms of eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) 
which is developed by Shapiro and used as a therapeutic technique in the 
treatment of PTSD (as cited in Christman et al., 2003). This technique 
involves bilateral saccadic eye movements that are presumably associated 
with interhemispheric integration. Therapist applying EMDR technique has 
been indicated an increase in conscious retrieval of traumatic episodes, 
which in turn associated with successful therapeutic outcomes (e.g. van der 
Kolk, Burbridge, & Suzuki, as cited in Christman et al., 2003) 
 
4.2 Limitations and Implications for Further Research 
The major drawback of the present study was the absence of an 
adequate sample size that allows analyses of interaction among different 
conditions. Inadequate sample size was especially evident in the analyses 
regarding suppression success and suppression effort. Because of that these 
statistical analyses were conducted via nonparametric tests. However, 
“nonparametric test may lack the power to reject null hypothesis”, if it is 
false (Kinnear & Gray, 2000, p. 147). Moreover, this study lacks the 
opportunity for examining a triple interaction among suppression effort, 
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suppression success and degree of handedness on memory processes due to 
inadequate sample size of each category of interaction. For future studies, a 
larger sample enabling the application of such analysis is recommended. 
For examining the potential neurobiological mechanism underlying 
the relationship between thought suppression and decreased 
interhemispheric integration, this study does not provide definite 
conclusions due to its methodology. In order to make more confident 
conclusions, brain activations should be directly assessed during and after 
thought suppression, and during implicit and explicit retrieval of suppressed 
and nonsuppressed information.  Moreover, the role of bilateral brain 
activity in emotion regulation is not clear yet. Techniques of neuroscience 
should be applied in order to get a deeper insight about emotion regulation 
mechanisms. 
The current study failed to indicate the validity and reliability of 
participants’ remember-know judgments. For future research including 
remember-know paradigm, some strategies should be developed in order to 
check whether participants’ understanding of the task is accurate and the 
variation in their responses reflect their true variation.  
 Finally, this study does not provide opportunity for comparing 
implicit and explicit performances of the same person as a function of 
thought suppression (i.e. within-subjects studies). Furthermore, follow-up 
studies are recommended to see long-term effects of thought suppression on 
both memory processes and regulation of emotional experience.  
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4.3 Summary and Conclusion 
Thought suppression, one of the emotion regulation strategies, 
involves conscious attempt to avoid unwanted thoughts. Thought 
suppression precedes repressions, at least in one type of repression (i.e. 
automatized suppression). The present study investigated the effect of 
thought suppression on different forms of memory systems and its relation 
to degree of handedness which is assumed as an indication of 
interhemispheric integration. The result of the study indicated no effect of 
mere suppression instruction in all conditions. However, marginal 
impairment in conscious retrieval of suppressed stimuli was observed only 
when individuals manage to refuse to think of unwanted thoughts even 
though they found the target too demanding to suppress. Under this 
condition implicit memory performance was preserved as compared to other 
conditions (i.e. suppression with high success-low effect, low success-low 
effort, and low success-high effort). Erosion of traces of suppressed stimuli 
was detected only when the participants found the target stimuli personally 
irrelevant and successfully suppressed them. It is concluded that while 
depletion of resources associated with rehearsal interruption provides the 
best explanation for the disturbance in explicit memory performances, 
priming effect of monitoring process is more sufficient to explain an intact 
implicit memory performance. These findings represent a similar process in 
repression. Moreover, successful thought suppression was associated with a 
decline in episodic memory performance of mixed-handed individuals. 
Therefore, a potential relation of thought suppression to decreased 
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hemispheric integration was suggested. Potential role of bilateral brain 
activities in emotion regulation, particularly in perceiving the external world 
as less threatening/negative was pointed. Nonetheless, the current study 
failed to provide evidence for suppression effect on decreased retrieval of 
associated details, and on the relationship between mixed-handedness and 
retrieval of associated details. Even though the presence of some limitations 
and inadequacies, the present study has importance for providing an 
integrative frame for thought suppression theories, suggesting an 
experimental setting for examining at least one type of repression, and 
pointing to the role of interhemispheric integration in regulating negative 
emotional experiences. 
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Appendix A: Informed consent 
 
 
Bilgi ve Onay Formu 
 
Sayın Katılımcı; 
 
‘Duygu ve Bilişsel İşlevler’ konulu çalışmama gönüllü katılımınızı rica 
ediyorum. Bu çalışmanın amacı duyguların bilişsel süreçlere etkilerini 
araştırmaktır. 
 
Bu çalışmaya katılmak için araştırmacıyla yaklaşık olarak kırk beş dakika 
sürecek bir görüşme gerçekleştirmeniz gerekmektedir.  
 
Katılımcı olarak kimliğiniz gizli tutulacaktır. Ad soyad gibi kişisel 
bilgileriniz sadece bu onay formunun üzerinde yer alacak, bu form da diğer 
anketlerden ayrı bir yerde saklanacaktır. Diğer anket formlarının üzerinde 
sadece her katılımcıya verilen kimlik numarası yer alacaktır. Bu araştırmada 
dile getirilen görüşler anonim olarak ve bir grup halinde değerlendirilecek, 
böyle bir araştırmaya katıldığınız bilgisi hiç kimse ile paylaşılmayacak, 
kişisel bilgileriniz araştırmadan çıkan herhangi bir yayın ya da sunumda 
kullanılmayacaktır.  
 
Araştırmaya katılımınızın size herhangi bir zarar vereceği 
öngörülmemektedir. Katılmak gönüllülük esasına dayanmaktadır ve 
istediğiniz anda çalışmaya devam etmeme hakkına sahipsiniz. Çalışmadan 
geri çekilme durumunda söz konusu ders için 2 kredi kazanma hakkını 
kaybetmeyeceksiniz. Sizden ricamız eğer bu çalışmaya katılmaya gönüllü 
olursanız, araştırmamızın güvenirliği açısından anketin tümünü 
olabildiğince samimi ve etraflıca yanıtlamanızdır. 
 
Bu araştırma İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Klinik Psikoloji yüksek lisans 
öğrencilerinden Gülcan Akçalan’ın (gakcalan@bilgi.edu.tr) yüksek lisans 
bitirme tezi için yürütülmektedir. Araştırmanın danışmanı Doğuş 
Üniversitesi psikoloji bölümü öğretim üyesi Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hasan 
Bahçekapılı’dır. ( hbahcekapili@dogus.edu.tr). Araştırma ile ilgili 
sorularınız olursa bu kişilere ulaşabilirsiniz. 
 
Bu araştırmaya katkıda bulunduğunuz için teşekkür ederiz. 
 
* * * * 
Yukarıdaki açıklamayı okudum, belirtilenleri anladım, bu formun bir 
örneğini de aldım ve bu çerçevede bu araştırma projesine katılmayı kabul 
ediyorum. 
 
__________________   __________________ ______________ 
Katılımcının adı-soyadı   Katılımcının imzası  Tarih 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire for assessing the presence of inclusion 
criteria 
 
 
 Kişisel Bilgi Formu 
1. Tarih:  
2. Yaşınız: 
3. Cinsiyetiniz:    K                  E 
4. Şu anda herhangi bir sağlık sorunu yaşıyor musunuz? Evetse açıklar 
mısınız? 
 
 
5. Şu anda ya da geçmişte bir psikologa, psikiyatriste ya da nörologa 
başvurdunuz mu? Evetse açıklar mısınız (ne zaman, ne sebeple, ne r 
süre yardım aldınız)?  
 
   Hayır              Evetse; 
 
6. Şu anda ya da geçmişte herhangi bir psikiyatrik ilaç kullanıyor 
musunuz ya da kullandınız mı? Evetse açıklar mısınız (ne zaman, ne 
sebeple, ne kadar süre)? 
 
   Hayır              Evetse; 
 
Sebebi 
 
 
Zamanı  
 
Süresi 
 
Bu ilacı/ilaçları halen kullanıyor musunuz? 
 
7. Şu anda görmeyle ilgili bir probleminiz var mı? Evetse açıklar 
mısınız? Şu anda bu probleminiz için gözlük, lens, ilaç vb. bir şey 
kullanıyor musunuz? 
                
Sebebi 
 
 
Zamanı  
 
Yardım alınan süre 
 
Bu durum halen devam ediyor mu? 
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Appendix C: Turkish version of the Symptom Assessment-45 
Questionnaire (SA-45)  
 
 
 
Zaman zaman karşılaşabildiğimiz problemlerin bir listesi aşağıda verilmiştir. Dikkatle okuduktan sonra bugün dâhil son 7 gün 
boyunca bu problemlerin sizde yarattığı rahatsızlık veya gerginliğin derecesini en iyi tanımlayan sayıyı işaretleyin. Her sorun için 
sadece bir işaretleme yapın ve herhangi bir seçeneği atlamamaya özen gösterin. Teşekkürler... 
  
1 Kendimi yalnız hissediyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
2 Hüzünlüyüm 1 2 3 4 5 
3 Hiçbir şey ilgimi ekmiyor 1 2 3 4 5 
4 Korkuyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
5 Başkalarının düşüncelerimi kontrol edebileceğini düşünüyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
6 Sorularımın birçoğu için başkalarını suçluyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Açık alanlarda veya sokakta korkuyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
8 Başkalarının duymadığı sesler duyuyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
9 Çoğu insanın güvenilmez olduğunu düşünüyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
10 Sebepsiz yere birden bire korkuya kapılıyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
11 Kontrol edemediğim öfke patlamaları yaşıyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
12 Tek başıma evden çıkmaya korkuyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
13 Diğer insanların kafamdaki düşüncelerin farkında olduğunu düşünüyorum  1 2 3 4 5 
14 İnsanların beni anlamadığını ve hislerimi paylaşmadığını düşünüyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
15 İnsanların bana dostça yaklaşmadığını ve benden hoşlanmadığını düşünüyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
16 Düzgünlüğünden ve doğruluğundan emin olmak için işleri çok yavaş yapmak zorundayım 1 2 3 4 5 
17 Kendimi diğerlerine göre daha aşağı hissediyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
18 Adale ağrılarım var 1 2 3 4 5 
19 Başkalarının beni gözetlediğini veya benim hakkımda konuştuğunu düşünüyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
20 Yaptığımı tekrar tekrar kontrol ediyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
21 Karar vermekte zorlanıyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
22 Otobüs, metro veya trenle yolculuk yapmaktan korkuyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
23 Sıcak basıyor veya soğuk soğuk terliyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
24 Beni korkuttukları için, belli şeyler, yerler ya da faaliyetlerden kaçınıyorum  1 2 3 4 5 
25 Zihnim birden boşalıyor 1 2 3 4 5 
26 Vücudumun bazı kısımları uyuşuyor veya karıncalanıyor 1 2 3 4 5 
27 Gelecek hakkında umutsuzum 1 2 3 4 5 
28 Konsantre olmakta güçlük çekiyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
29 Vücudumun bazı kısımlarında güçsüzlük hissediyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
30 Kendimi gergin ya da tedirgin hissediyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
31 Kollarında veya bacaklarımda ağırlık hissediyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
32 İnsanlar bana baktıklarında veya benim hakkımda konuştuklarında kendimi rahatsız hissediyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
33 Kendime ait olmaya düşüncelerim var 1 2 3 4 5 
34 Birine vurma, incitme veya zarar verme isteği geliyor 1 2 3 4 5 
35 Bir şeyleri kırma veya ezme isteği geliyor 1 2 3 4 5 
36 İnsanlarla beraberken beni nasıl algılayacaklar diye tedirgin oluyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
37 Alışveriş yerleri veya sinema gibi kalabalık yerlerde kendimi rahatsız hissediyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
38 Korku veya panik nöbetleri yaşıyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
39 İnsanlarla sık sık tartışıyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
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40 İnsanlar başarılarımı yeteri kadar takdir etmiyor 1 2 3 4 5 
41 O kadar huzursuzum ki, bir türlü yerimde duramıyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
42 Kendimi değersiz hissediyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
43 Bağırıyorum veya bir şeyler fırlatıyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
44 İzin verirsem insanların benden yararlanmak isteyeceklerini düşünüyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
45 İşlediğim günahlar için cezalandırılmam gerektiğini düşünüyorum 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix D: Turkish version of The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory  
**Aşağıdaki tabloda önce, söz konusu faaliyeti yaparken hangi elinizi 
kullanmayı tercih ettiğinizi 2. sütun üzerinde belirtiniz. Söz konusu faaliyet 
için her iki elinizi de eşit şekilde kullanabiliyorsanız “FARK ETMEZ” 
seçeneğini işaretleyiniz.  
 
**Hemen ardından da (eğer ilk değerlendirmede “fark etmez” 
demediyseniz) söz konusu faaliyeti yaparken hiç diğer elinizi kullanıp 
kullanmadığınızı 3. sütun üzerinde belirtiniz. Eğer söz konusu faaliyet için, 
diğer elinizi çok zorunda kalmadıkça kullanmayı hiç denemiyorsanız 
“HAYIR” cevabını işaretleyiniz.  
 
**Aşağıda belirtilen faaliyetlerin bazıları iki el kullanmayı gerektirmektedir. 
Böyle durumlarda hangi elin kastedildiği parantez içinde belirtilmektedir. 
 
 
Faaliyet  
 
Hangi elinizi tercih edersiniz? 
 
Hiç diğer elinizi kullanır 
mısınız? 
 
Yazarken   SAĞ        SOL                FARK ETMEZ 
 
 EVET      HAYIR         
 
 
Resim yaparken  SAĞ        SOL                FARK ETMEZ 
 
 EVET      HAYIR         
 
 
Bir şey fırlatırken   SAĞ        SOL                FARK ETMEZ 
 
 EVET      HAYIR         
 
 
Makas 
kullanırken 
 SAĞ        SOL                FARK ETMEZ 
 
 EVET      HAYIR         
 
 
Diş fırçalarken   SAĞ        SOL                FARK ETMEZ 
 
 EVET      HAYIR         
 
 
Bıçak kullanırken 
(çatalsız) 
 SAĞ        SOL                FARK ETMEZ 
 
 EVET      HAYIR         
 
 
Kaşık kullanırken   SAĞ        SOL                FARK ETMEZ 
 
 EVET      HAYIR         
 
 
Süpürürken 
 (üstteki el) 
 SAĞ        SOL                FARK ETMEZ 
 
 EVET      HAYIR         
 
 
Kibrit çakarken 
(kibriti tutan el) 
 SAĞ        SOL                FARK ETMEZ 
 
 EVET      HAYIR         
 
 
Bir kutuyu 
açarken (kapağı 
açan el) 
 SAĞ        SOL                FARK ETMEZ 
 
 EVET      HAYIR         
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Appendix E: Samples of Study Photos 
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Appendix F: Samples of Control/Distracter Photos 
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Appendix G: Samples of Photos used for preventing primary and 
recency effect.   
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Appendix H: Turkish version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI) -state anxiety part- 
 
 
 
YÖNERGE: Aşağıda kişilerin kendilerine ait duygularını anlatmakta kullandıkları bir takım 
ifadeler verilmiştir. Her ifadeyi okuyun, sonra şu anda hissettiğinizi ifadelerin sağ tarafındaki 
parantezlerden uygun olanını işaretlemek suretiyle belirtin. Doğru ya da yanlış cevap 
yoktur. Herhangi bir ifadenin üzerinde fazla zaman sarf etmeksizin anında nasıl 
hissettiğinizi gösteren cevabı işaretleyin.  
 
1 u anda sakinim 1 2 3 4 
2 Kendimi emniyette hissediyorum 1 2 3 4 
3 u anda sinirlerim gergin 1 2 3 4 
4 Pişmanlık duygusu içindeyim 1 2 3 4 
5 u anda huzur içindeyim 1 2 3 4 
6 u anda hiç keyfim yok 1 2 3 4 
7 Başıma geleceklerden endişe ediyorum 1 2 3 4 
8 Kendimi dinlenmiş hissediyorum 1 2 3 4 
9 u anda kaygılıyım 1 2 3 4 
10 Kendimi rahat hissediyorum 1 2 3 4 
11 Kendime güvenim var 1 2 3 4 
12 u anda asabım bozuk 1 2 3 4 
13 Çok sinirliyim 1 2 3 4 
14 Sinirlerimin çok gergin olduğunu hissediyorum 1 2 3 4 
15 Kendimi rahatlamış hissediyorum 1 2 3 4 
16 u anda halimden memnunum 1 2 3 4 
17 u anda endişeleniyorum 1 2 3 4 
18 Heyecandan kendimi şaşkına dönmüş hissediyorum 1 2 3 4 
19 u anda sevinçliyim 1 2 3 4 
20 u anda keyfim yerinde 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix I: Arithmetical task  
 
“Aşağıda bazı matematik soruları yer almaktadır. Sırayla bu soruları 
cevaplandırınız. Yapamadığınız soruları geçebilirsiniz.”  
 
1. Aşağıdaki işlemleri yapınız. 
 
 
 
 426         504          730             461  
557        7          414  281 
+_________           x_________              -_________    +________
     
 
 
 
 
 
      368     8     905   861           28 
               470                            9           47 
         -_________            x_________                 x_________          
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. c ve d sayıları üzerinde # işlemi; 
c # d =    c . d    şeklinde tanımlıdır.  
     c + d   
Örneğin c=2, d=1 için sonuç,   
2#1= 2x1    =    2       ‘tür. 
         2+1   3 
c # 6=4 olduğuna göre c değeri nedir? 
 
 
 
3. Ezgi, bir kitabı günde ortalama 25 sayfa okuyarak 12 günde bitirmeyi 
planlıyor. Ezgi, günde ortalama 15 sayfa okursa bu kitabı kaç günde 
bitirebilir?  
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4. Bir satıcı, satış fiyatı 480 lira olan bir malı, satış fiyatı üzerinden %20 
indirimle sattığında bu malı kaça satmış olur? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
5. Aşağıdaki işlemleri yapınız. 
 
 
 
1029                      702      13     2933    74 
 4696          1519    37 
+___________             -_______      x_________ 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
    1651     27    6073         4299   4144   55 
  5395                    7841 
        -_________                  +___________ 
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Appendix J: Remember-Know-Guess Instructions 
 
 
 
 
Şimdi size bir dizi fotoğraf gösterilecektir. Gösterilen fotoğrafların bir kısmı 
biraz önce görmüş olduğunuz eski fotoğraflardır. Bir kısmı ise daha önce 
görmediğiniz yeni fotoğraflardır. Sizden, fotoğrafları daha önce görüp 
görmediğinizi belirtmenizi istiyorum.  Her bir fotoğraf için, söz konusu 
fotoğrafı daha önce gördüyseniz klavyenin E tuşuna, görmediyseniz H 
tuşuna basınız.  
 
 
Evet:  E     Hayır:  H 
 
 
“Evet, bu fotoğrafı ben önceki listede gördüm” dediğiniz durumlarda sizden 
bir değerlendirme daha yapmanızı istiyorum: 
 
 
 
(Devam etmek için herhangi lütfen herhangi bir tuşa basın.)  
 
 
 
 
Bazı tip hatırlamalarda, fotoğrafı önceden gördüğümüzü hatırlamamıza ek 
olarak o fotoğrafla ilgili olarak yaşadığımız bazı ayrıntıları da 
hatırlayabiliriz. Mesela, fotoğrafın o listedeki yerini, hangi fotoğraftan önce 
veya sonra geldiğini, fotoğrafın aklımıza getirmiş olduğu bir olayı veya 
düşünceyi ya da uyandırdığı bir duyguyu da hatırlayabiliriz. Yani, sadece 
fotoğrafı gördüğümüzü değil, onu gördüğümüz an ile ilgili bir bilgi de 
hatırlarız. İşte bu tip hafızaya “hatırlama” tipi hafıza diyoruz.   
 
Diğer yandan yine fotoğrafı daha önce gördüğümüzden kesin olarak 
eminizdir fakat onunla ilgili başka da hiçbir şey hatırlamayız. Yani, o 
fotoğrafı önceden gördüğümüzü biliriz, ancak onu gördüğümüz an ile ilgili 
başka bir ayrıntı hatırlamayız.   Buna da“bilme” tipi hafıza diyoruz. 
 
 
 
 
(Devam etmek için herhangi lütfen herhangi bir tuşa basın.) 
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Mesela, izlediğimiz bir filmle ilgili, o filme kiminle gittiğimizi, sinemada 
nerede oturduğumuzu, filmle ilgili o andaki duygu veya düşüncelerimizi vb. 
birçok ayrıntıyı canlı bir şekilde hatırlayabiliriz. Bu durum hatırlama 
dediğimiz hafıza tipidir. Diğer yandan bazen de, filmi seyrettiğimizi kesin 
biliriz, filmin içeriğini vs. hatırlarız, ancak ne zaman, kiminle, nerede o 
filme gittiğimizi kesinlikle hatırlamayız. Bu da bilme tipi hafızadır.   
 
 
 
Şimdi sizden, gördüğünüzü hatırladığınız her fotoğrafın ardından hafıza 
tipinizi de belirtmenizi istiyorum. Fotoğrafı gördüğünüz anla ilgili kimi 
ayrıntıları da hatırlıyorsanız, klavyenin H (hatırlama) tuşuna basın. Yok, 
sadece fotoğrafı daha önce gördüğünüzden eminseniz ancak gördüğünüz 
anla ilgili herhangi bir ayrıntıyı hatırlamıyorsanız, klavyenin B (bilme) 
tuşuna basın.   
 
 
 
(Devam etmek için herhangi lütfen herhangi bir tuşa basın.) 
 
 
 
 
Fakat bazen “evet, bu fotoğrafı daha önce gördüm” diye düşünürüz ve 
“evet” seçeneğini belirtiriz ancak emin değilizdir, gördüğümüzü tahmin 
ediyoruzdur. Eğer “evet”iniz bu tarz bir hatırlamaysa lütfen klavyenin T 
(tahmin) tuşuna basın. 
 
 
Hatırlama: H       Bilme: B            Tahmin: T 
 
 
 
Ekrandaki resmi daha önce görüp görmediğinizi belirttikten hemen sonra, 
eğer gördüyseniz söz konusu fotoğraf için hafıza tipiniz sorulacaktır. Tuşa 
basar basmaz bir sonraki fotoğraf ekranda görülecektir. Aynı işlemi her bir 
fotoğraf için tekrarlayınız. Deneye başlamadan önce 5 fotoğraf ile bir 
deneme yapacaksınız. 
 
 
 
Deneye başlamak için lütfen herhangi bir tuşa basın.  
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Appendix K: Scales for Suppression Effort (1), and Suppression 
Success (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Deneyin başında gösterilen resimleri düşünmemeniz istendiği süre 
boyunca, resimleri düşünmemek için ne kadar çaba harcadığınızı 0 ila 100 
arasında bir sayı ile belirtiniz (0=hiç çaba harcamadım; 100=çok fazla çaba 
harcadım). 
 
 
 
2) Deneyin başında gösterilen resimleri düşünmemeniz istendiği süre 
boyunca, resimleri düşünmemekte ne kadar başarılı olduğunuzu, yani 
resimleri ne derece zihninizden uzak tutabildiğinizi 0 ila 100 arasında bir 
sayı ile belirtiniz (0=hiç başarılı olamadım, yani resimler sürekli aklıma 
geldi; 100=son derece başarılı oldum, yani resimler hiç aklıma gelmedi). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
